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1Introduction
Across the globe, there is increasing concern about
income inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that
over the last three decades, income inequality has
grown in many developed economies (the extent and
time frame of this trend varying considerably). The
Great Recession starting in 2008–2009 intensified this
concern due to the impact of the ongoing economic
crisis on inequality levels, and the general perception
that the increase in inequality may have been one of the
factors triggering and protracting the crisis.
Although there is a large body of research on trends in
income inequality in EU Member States, surprisingly few
studies adopt an EU-wide perspective. In this context,
this report has two main goals: to provide a
comparative analysis of inequality trends in Member
States over the course of the Great Recession (updating
the picture given by previous international studies); and
to discuss relevant trends and developments in
inequality for the overall EU distribution of income –
including the implications of economic convergence
and divergence before and after the crisis. Most of the
analysis in this report is drawn from the European Union
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for
the period 2005–2014, with income data relating to the
period 2004–2013.
Policy context
Evidence regarding the evolution of inequality in the EU
as a whole is surprisingly limited, despite the growing
interest in the phenomenon and the increasing level of
European economic integration. In many EU policy
documents, there is an implicit assumption that
economic integration should lead to some degree of
convergence in terms of income and wages and hence
result in a reduction in EU-wide inequality (at least
between countries). But the uneven effects of the Great
Recession across EU Member States show that
convergence is not an automatic outcome of economic
integration: there is a need to monitor inequality trends
at the EU level as well. Good EU-level statistics on
income inequality trends could facilitate a better
understanding of the wider implications of the
European integration project and improve the
coordination of existing policies to fight inequality.
These include EU regional policy, focused on
inequalities between countries, and European and
national social policies targeted at inequalities within
countries.
Key findings
EU-wide income inequalities: Before 2008, EU-level
income inequalities across different sources of income
had declined significantly as a result of a process of
income convergence between countries (with
inequalities within countries remaining rather stable).
After 2008, EU-level income inequality grew for two
reasons: firstly, the process of income convergence
stalled, with income levels being more negatively
affected in some peripheral countries than in the core
EU Member States generally; and secondly, there was
an expansion of income inequalities within countries in
most sources of income.
Convergence in household disposable income:
A detailed analysis of household disposable income
shows that the process of income convergence prior to
2008 was driven mainly by a catch-up process in eastern
European countries and a stagnation or decline in
relative income levels in several high-income countries,
such as Continental countries (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and the
UK. The interruption of the process of convergence after
2008 is associated with a significant decline in relative
income levels in some countries in the European
periphery in the initial years (mainly the Baltic states,
some Mediterranean Member States, and Ireland), while
core European countries were more resilient. After 2011,
paths began to diverge within the peripheral group,
with the Baltic states and other eastern European
countries recovering rapidly, while income levels
experienced downward adjustments in Mediterranean
Member States.
Inequality in household disposable income across
countries: Inequalities in household disposable income
grew in two-thirds of Member States over the whole
period, continuing the general upward trend in
inequalities identified by a number of different
international studies. Nevertheless, this is mainly due to
increasing inequalities after 2008, largely driven by
growing unemployment in many countries during the
recession. The finding that unemployment has been the
main driver of growing inequalities during the Great
Recession complements previous studies signalling
widening wage differentials as the main reason behind
growing inequalities in the decades prior to the crisis. 
Counter-cyclicality of household disposable income
inequalities: This central role of unemployment and its
effect on labour income largely explains why
inequalities in household disposable income have
behaved counter-cyclically in recent years. Prior to the
crisis, inequalities declined in more than half the
Executive summary
2Member States –  mainly in the European periphery,
which was experiencing an economic catch-up process.
From the onset of the crisis, inequalities in household
disposable income grew across two-thirds of the
countries, mainly in some peripheral countries more
severely hit by the crisis, but also in some core Member
States (Germany) and some traditionally egalitarian
countries (Denmark and Sweden). 
Alleviating the effect: Two key mechanisms are shown
to reduce levels of inequality. First, the role of welfare
state redistribution in reducing inequality became even
more important during this period, especially in
countries hardest hit by the crisis in the European
periphery, where welfare states largely cushioned
growing market income inequalities. Second, the family
pooling of resources reduced the inequality in labour
income observed among individuals, although its effect
weakened as the crisis progressed. This is due to the
increase in the number of households with no labour
income and, to a lesser extent, because of a long-term
decline in the size of households. 
Evolution of real income levels: An even more obvious
impact of the Great Recession is revealed by
information on real income levels; these were either
pushed downwards, or their growth rate reduced. This
correction was generally greater in the European
periphery (in Mediterranean and some eastern
European countries in a protracted way, and in Anglo-
Saxon and Baltic countries during the initial stage of the
financial crisis) and especially at the bottom of the
income distribution, but it occurred as well, although
more modestly, in Continental and Scandinavian
countries. The deterioration in income levels from the
onset of the crisis among some segments of the income
distribution has squeezed the size of the middle class in
a majority of countries. This is significant in some
peripheral countries in eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean, and in countries like Denmark, Germany
and Sweden, where the middle class was starting to
shrink even before the crisis.
Need for wider set of indicators: The impact of the
crisis revealed by real income levels is not always
reflected by relative inequality indices or by other
indicators such as GDP per capita. This suggests that a
wider set of indicators to assess well-being and
economic prosperity in European societies needs to be
considered in order to properly assess the fall in living
standards associated with the Great Recession. 
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3Concerns over growing inequality across developed
economies are notably present in academic research
and policy debates in recent years. Even before the
Great Recession, concerns emerged about income
disparities between European regions and rising levels
of inequality across developed economies over the past
three decades (OECD, 2008). The financial crisis that
emerged by the end of 2008 and the debt crisis that
ensued have aggravated these concerns (OECD, 2011).
Growing inequalities and declining labour shares have
been highlighted as some of the reasons behind a
weakening of aggregate demand in many developed
countries, which may have contributed to the Great
Recession.The crisis has also had an uneven impact
across countries, economic sectors and demographic
groups, potentially amplifying underlying inequality
trends both inside and outside labour markets. Even
after the resumption of economic growth, sluggish real
wages across many Member States call into question
the strength of the recovery of income levels among
significant segments of the workforce, let alone the
population at large.
EU Member States have been undergoing a process of
economic integration spanning several decades, a
process that was accelerated by the creation of the euro
and that has been recently tested by the emergence of
global financial turmoil and the ensuing sovereign debt
crisis. The Great Recession has had an uneven impact
across the EU. Labour market performance across
Member States has diverged considerably, with
employment and real wages rising in core economies
and falling in peripheral economies. While most
countries were affected by the global financial crisis, the
employment turbulence related to the sovereign debt
crisis has been much more concentrated in peripheral
economies (European Central Bank, 2014). Some of the
most stressed countries have adopted fiscal
consolidation measures, structural reforms and internal
devaluations aimed at recovering competitiveness in a
monetary union, which may have weakened downward
rigidities in wage levels (European Central Bank, 2015).
The diverging impacts of the crisis and the strategies
put in place to fight it have certainly resulted in different
wage, income and unemployment trends across
countries. Against this background, it is relevant to map
trends in income inequalities and income levels and to
do so from an EU-wide perspective, looking at
developments both between and within EU Member
States. In principle, a certain degree of convergence in
income levels should be expected between Member
States due to a process of economic integration in
which lower income countries would progressively
catch up with higher-income countries. But the recent
crisis and the bleak European economic outlook may
have created forces of divergence arising from the
uneven impact of economic and labour market
turbulence within Europe. 
Oddly, studies adopting an EU-wide perspective to map
trends in inequality are scarce. To the best knowledge
of the authors, no exhaustive, cross-country
comparative analysis on income inequality has been
conducted on developments across EU Member States
over the recent crisis period. This report will seek to fill
these two main gaps. The report builds on previous
Eurofound work (Eurofound, 2015), taking an EU-wide
perspective by analysing inequality developments both
between and within Member States; this time, however,
the scope extends beyond wages to include overall
income, which is probably subject to more substantial
variations in a period characterised by notable
employment turbulence. In addition, this report aims to
update recent empirical analysis covering inequality
developments among many Member States from recent
decades up to the end of the 2000s (OECD, 2008, 2011)
by providing a much-needed comprehensive picture of
trends in income inequalities across different sources of
income and most Member States during the years of the
Great Recession, covering the period 2005–2014
(income data referring to 2004–2013).
The report is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 will
introduce the relevant literature on income inequality.
Chapter 2 presents the methodological framework
followed in this report to approach the study of
inequalities in Europe over the past decade. Chapter 3
maps inequalities from an EU-wide perspective and
shows how developments between and within countries
affect the EU-wide income distribution over time.
Chapter 4 provides a picture of income differentials
between countries, while Chapter 5 discusses income
inequalities within countries. Chapter 6 complements
the analysis by looking at the trends in income levels
that are behind income inequality patterns. Chapter 7
concludes with a summary of the findings and a
discussion of some policy implications.
Introduction

5Although a relevant strand of the literature has
produced empirical studies on global inequality levels
(Milanovic, 2005), a comprehensive analysis of
inequality in supranational entities such as the EU has
rarely been attempted. Most existing studies on income
inequalities focus on developments within countries,
typically using the measure of household disposable
income, although the impact of its different
components has been often discussed as well. There are
also studies on country differentials in average wage or
income levels, but these studies rarely cover these
differentials together with inequality developments
within the country, nor do they attempt to evaluate
inequality at the supranational level. This chapter
summarises the main relevant findings from the
literature. It will discuss what is known about recent
trends in income inequality and its different
components and it will briefly review the few previous
studies that take an EU-wide perspective on this issue. 
Income inequality by component
The measure of income typically covered in empirical
studies on income inequality is household disposable
income, which is the aggregation of several income
components that result from labour market outcomes,
capital, household composition and the progressivity of
the tax and transfer systems (Bonesmo Fredriksen,
2012).
According to a recent OECD study (OECD, 2011), a
general widening of wage inequalities between 1980
and 2008 occurred across most OECD countries, a trend
that seemed to intensify in the late 1990s and 2000s. It
was due to developments at both extremes of the
distribution, but mainly at the top, since top earners
registered a rapid progress of wage levels. Importantly,
this report finds that wage inequalities were the main
reason behind growing income inequalities in OECD
countries over the period 1980 to 2008: ‘Increases in
household income inequality have been largely driven
by changes in the distribution of wages and salaries,
which account for 75% of household incomes among
working-age adults’ (OECD, 2011). 
Some of the main reasons identified in the literature to
explain the growing inequalities in wages are skills-
biased technical change, by which new technologies
increase the relative productivity of high-skilled
workers, their demand and wages (Violante, 2008);
trade specialisation and off-shoring, which may have a
dampening effect on the wages of low-skilled workers in
Member States (Blau and Kahn, 2009); and
developments in labour market institutions, such as the
weakening of trade unions and declining coverage of
collective pay agreements (European Commission,
2013) or the trend towards decentralisation in wage-
setting mechanisms in several countries (Visser and
Checchi, 2009).
The dispersion of working hours has been highlighted as
an important reason behind growing disparities when
measures of unadjusted labour earnings are used,
which would result in temporary and part-time workers
occupying the bottom of the wage distribution
(Burniaux, 1997), the former due to unemployment
spells pushing annual labour incomes downwards and
the latter due to shorter working hours generally.
A recent report from the European Parliament underlines
the key role played by working hours in growing
inequalities in labour earnings across two-thirds of EU
countries between 2006 and 2011 against a background
of expanding part-time employment since the onset of
the crisis (European Parliament, 2014). 
The inclusion of income from self-employment results
in higher inequality levels, since labour income is more
unevenly distributed among self-employed workers
than among employees (OECD, 2011). This is also the
case with the inclusion of capital income, which is more
unevenly distributed than labour income. Nevertheless,
the role of capital in explaining growing inequality is
somewhat unclear empirically. Many studies assign a
secondary role to capital income compared with labour
income when driving inequality trends, perhaps due to
the fact that survey data have difficulties measuring
capital and the income flows derived from it.1
Nevertheless, recent work by Piketty and other
researchers based on data from tax records shows that
capital income has greatly contributed to rising
inequality in recent decades and it will continue to do
so given declining labour shares across most developed
countries (Piketty, 2014). Capital is very important in the
debate on the importance of the top of the income
distribution as a driver of growing inequalities. This
seems especially relevant in the US and has led some
researchers to criticise inequality studies using decile
ratios and failing to report on the very large income
growth experienced by the top 1% (Rosnick and Baker,
2012; Atkinson et al, 2011).
1 Literature review 
1 The European Central Bank’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey is a good example of a survey that gathers micro-level data on capital more
adequately, but only one wave of data exists so far and it provides structural information on euro area households’ assets and liabilities and not merely on
capital income flows.
6The pooling of different types of income at the
household level affects inequality levels notably. The
inclusion of dependants and households where nobody
works widens the income distribution, but the pooling
of income between family members at the household
level has been shown empirically to have a strong role
in reducing inequalities. Furthermore, the distribution
of household labour income among people has been
more stable than the distribution of personal labour
income among workers (OECD, 2008). Nevertheless,
changes in the family structure over the last decades,
mainly the decline in the average household size due to
more people living alone or more single-parent families,
are reducing the redistributive impact of the household
(Nolan et al, 2014).2
The final components of total household disposable
income are public transfers and taxes. Recent research
shows that the tax and benefit system reduces market
income inequalities by around 25% to 33% on average
across OECD countries, playing a more significant role
at the bottom than at the top half of the income
distribution, and with taxes and transfers in cash being
more effective than in-kind benefits such as education,
health, and housing. Nevertheless, as happened with
the role of families, the welfare system has generally
become less redistributive from the mid-1990s and has
therefore contributed to growing inequality levels in
household disposable income (for instance, as a result
of reductions in income taxes or tightening the criteria
to access unemployment and other benefits; see Nolan
et al, 2014; OECD, 2008, 2011).
Recent evolution of income
inequalities
Growing inequalities in household disposable income
from the 1970s have taken place across many
developed countries according to several recent
empirical studies. For instance, a recent OECD study
identifies growing income inequalities in 17 of the 22
countries covered between the mid-1980s and the late
2000s (OECD, 2011). An earlier study concluded that
‘there has been an increase in income inequality that
has gone on since at least the mid-1980s and probably
since the mid-1970s. The widening has affected most
(but not all) countries … But the increase in inequality –
though widespread and significant – has not been as
spectacular as most people probably think it has been’
(OECD, 2008). 
Some researchers have identified a convergence
towards higher levels of inequality across countries, but
the timing and magnitude of such increases varies
(Jenkins and Micklewright, 2007). Inequalities grew first
in Anglo-Saxon countries at the end of the 1970s and the
beginning of the early 1980s. They generalised by the
end of the 1980s and 1990s, reaching eastern European
and Mediterranean countries and even affecting
traditionally low-inequality countries such as the
Scandinavian countries during the 2000s (OECD, 2011;
Ballarino et al, 2012). The most general increases in
income inequality seem to have taken place in the
1980s and 1990s, while country patterns seem to have
become more diverse in the 2000s. A recent study
identifies some convergence in inequality levels
between 1997 and 2009 across EU15 countries, but
mixed patterns across EU27 countries (European
Commission, 2011). 
The evolution of income inequality over the business
cycle is of particular interest against the background of
the recent crisis. Theoretically, income inequality
should be counter-cyclical, increasing during downturns
(Storesletten et al, 2004; Bonhomme and Hospido,
2012). On the other hand, wage levels are supposed to
be pro-cyclical, since the movement of workers towards
jobs of better overall or match-specific quality would be
more difficult during recessions and vice versa
(Jovanovic, 1979; Farber, 1999).
Although it is country specific and heavily dependent on
institutional factors, empirical studies tend to identify
counter-cyclicality in the evolution of net income and
unadjusted annual labour earnings, which is largely due
to the mediating role played by unemployment in
depriving individuals of labour income (Maestri and
Roventini, 2012). This may explain why the counter-
cyclicality is much weaker or absent for inequalities in
hourly wages, which only refers to people who remain in
employment (which can be affected by unemployment
only indirectly or compositionally, with uncertain
results).
The divergence observed between the business cycle
behaviour of income and wage levels can also be
explained by the role of unemployment. A pro-cyclical
pattern emerges for income levels due to loss of labour
earnings for people exiting the workforce, while
empirical studies have typically failed to identify a clear
real wage pro-cyclicality, with results depending on the
choice of the time period, price deflator or cyclical
indicator (Abraham and Haltiwanger, 1995). This has
been more recently blamed on the use of aggregate
data up to the 1980s, since a pro-cyclical behaviour of
real wages was often identified once micro-panel data
started to be used. Compositional effects would explain
the lack of wage pro-cyclicality when using aggregate
instead of individual data: an upward (and counter-
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
2 Some studies focus on income inequalities within households (Chiappori and Meghir, 2014). In this paper, such a possible source of inequality will not be
taken into account since household income will be equally distributed among all members in the empirical analysis. 
7cyclical) bias in aggregate wage levels may be caused by
declining employment shares of low-skilled, low-wage
workers during recessions and vice versa (Bils, 1985;
Solon et al, 1994). 
What does the recent empirical literature say on the
impact of the Great Recession on inequality levels?
A few studies have mapped inequality trends across
Member States from the onset of the crisis, but results
are somewhat contradictory. Some claim that the
picture is mixed across countries and that income
inequality did not increase generally and significantly
during the initial years of the crisis (European
Commission, 2011; Jenkins et al, 2011; Foster-McGregor
et al, 2014; European Parliament, 2015), while others
identify growing income inequality levels across most
OECD countries between 2007 and 2010, as households
at the bottom decile of the income distribution
benefited less from rising incomes or were more
affected by income declines than those at the top
income decile (OECD, 2013). 
Income inequality from an
EU-wide perspective
While most existing studies provide a picture of
inequality developments within Member States, there
are good reasons to approach inequality from an
EU-wide perspective (considering the EU income
distribution as a whole and looking at the contribution
of between- and within-country developments). In the
words of Tony Atkinson (from more than two decades
ago; Atkinson, 1995, cited in Brandolini, 2007: 
‘If the Community continues to assess poverty purely
in national terms, taking 50 per cent of national
average income, then the impact of growth on
poverty in the Community will depend solely on what
happens within each country. However, a central
question concerns the possibility of moving to a
Community-wide poverty line, with the same
standard applied in all countries. In that case, the
effect of growth on the extent of low income is
affected by the relative growth rates of different
member countries.’
Information on inequality developments for the EU as a
whole remains very limited despite Atkinson’s early call.
One possible reason for this may be the lack of
adequate statistical sources providing the necessary
data until very recently. But it is also likely that an EU
perspective was considered simply irrelevant or
uninformative, since European labour markets remain
essentially national, regulated by laws or industrial
relations emanating at the country level and with
limited intra-EU labour mobility. As an example of this,
Eurostat’s information on the EU aggregate is
constructed from inequality levels across Member
States and does not really provide an estimate of
EU-wide inequality. However, there are some empirical
studies with an EU-level approach to estimate income
(and wage) inequality, summarised in Table 1.
Literature review
Table 1: Summary of empirical studies estimating inequality for the EU      
Reference Coverage Data source
Target
variable Main findings Numerical results
Eurofound (2015) EU24 countries,
2005–2012
EU-SILC and
SES
Full-time
equivalent
wages
A process of convergence in pay levels
between countries drives declining
inequalities before the crisis, after
which within-country developments
drive up EU-wide inequalities. 
Gini: 0.346 in 2012
Dauderstädt and
Keltek (2014)
EU27 EU-SILC Average per
capita income
Income inequality declines before the
crisis due to the process of
convergence between countries, but
it grows after the crisis. 
P80/P20 (2012): 6.5
(PPS): 9.5 (exchange
rates)
Bonesmo
Fredriksen (2012) 
22 EU
countries, 2008
OECD income
distribution
and poverty
database 
Disposable
income,
assigned to
individuals
using OECD
scale
Within-countries inequality accounts
for 85% of total EU inequality.
Inequality in the EU has increased
over time, both due to enlargements
and to growing inequalities in
countries for which data can be
compared over time.
Gini: 0.323
P90/P10: 4.86
P75/P25: 2.13
Dauderstädt and
Keltek (2011) 
EU27 and EU25,
2005–2008
EU-SILC Household
disposable
income,
assigned to
individuals
using OECD
scale 
Inequality in the EU decreased during
2005 to 2008. Inequality is lower when
measured in PPS than when using
exchange rates. When measured in
euros, inequality in the EU27 is higher
than in other large economies such as
India, the US, China or Russia; with
PPS, it is still higher than in India.
P80/P20 (PPS): 6.21
(2005) and 5.67 (2008)
for EU25; 7.23 (2007)
and 6.79 (2008) for
EU27
8Some of the findings from these empirical studies are
particularly relevant for the purposes of the current
report. First, EU-level income inequality seems
comparable to that of the US or other large economies.
To avoid overestimating EU-wide inequality levels,
income levels must be adjusted for price differences
between countries by using purchasing power parities
(PPP) instead of exchange rates. Second, although
around 90% of the EU-wide income inequality is
explained by within-country inequalities, income level
disparities between Member States are relevant and
their evolution played an important role in the run-up to
the crisis.
Some of the empirical studies mentioned in Table 1
report narrowing income disparities between Member
States; this is in line with classical theories of economic
growth, which would predict a process of convergence
in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and income
levels due to higher investments in lower income
countries (a catch-up effect), where capital is more
scarce and therefore returns to capital investment are
more profitable and productive. This process of
convergence would be stronger among countries that
share a similar economic and institutional setting, such
as is the case in the EU (Sachs and Warner, 1996).
Nevertheless, the economic theory of international
trade expects changes in income levels across countries
depending on their international specialisation (Stolper
and Samuelson, 1941), which would be difficult to
predict. In addition, events such as the Great Recession
may interrupt the income convergence pattern trend
due to an uneven impact across Member States. 
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Note: Databases presented as acronyms are European Community Household Panel (ECHP), Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS) and Consortium
of Household Panels for European Socio-economic Research (CHER). PPP = purchasing power parities. PPS = purchasing power standards.
Reference Coverage Data source
Target
variable Main findings Numerical results
Brandolini (2007) 21 EU countries
(EU15 + 6 new
Member
States), 2000
ECHP for the
EU-15 and LIS
for the rest
Household
disposable
income
Inequality is higher when income is
measured in euros instead of PPS
measures and when inequality is
measured for the EU as a whole
instead of the population-weighted
average of national values. Inequality
is lower in the EU than in the US. The
enlargement increased inequalities
within the EU: inequality is higher in
the EU25 than in the EU15 or euro
area.
Gini (PPP): EU25 0.33;
EU15 0.29; euro area
0.29; US 0.37
P80/P20 (PPP): EU25
2.8; EU15 2.3; euro area
2.3; US 2.9
Boix (2004) Several EU
aggregates,
early 2000s
World Bank
Household
Survey
Database
Individual
disposable
income or
expenditure,
obtained at
household level
Inequality in the EU27 is higher than
in the US (0.394). In all other EU
specifications, it is lower. Inequality
increased in the EU following each of
the successive enlargements,
especially when the eastern European
countries joined.
Gini: 0.342 (EU15), 0.38
(EU25), 0.399 (EU27)
Papatheodorou
and Pavlopoulos
(2003)
13 EU
countries, 1999
CHER Net household
income,
assigned to
individuals
using modified
OECD scale
Between-countries inequality
accounts for a small part of overall EU
inequality (8%), while 92% is due to
within-countries inequality.
Theil: 0.176 (between-
countries component:
0.015, 7.8%)
Beblo and Knaus
(2000)
Euro area (11
countries), 1995
ECHP and LIS
for Finland
Household
disposable
income,
assigned to
individuals
using modified
OECD scale
Between-countries inequality
accounts for 8% of overall EU
inequality. Government intervention
reduces inequality and intensifies
differences between countries.
Theil: 0.185
Atkinson (1996) 12 EU
countries,
Norway and
Switzerland,
1985–1990
LIS Household
disposable
income,
assigned to
individuals
using modified
OECD scale
The Europe-wide distribution is less
unequal than that of the US.
Bottom decile gets
2.9% of the income
(1.9% in the US);
bottom 50% gets 29.5%
of the income (26.2%
in the US); bottom 90%
gets 77.2% of the
income (76.3% in
the US)
9There are surprisingly few empirical studies covering
EU-wide inequality trends over the recent crisis. A very
recent study shows EU-wide income inequality levels
declining in the period 1995–2008, largely due to
economic convergence of central and eastern European
(CEE) countries, and remaining rather stable in the
period 2009–2015 (Darvas, 2016). The same pattern of
declining levels of EU-wide income inequality from 2005
(as a result of a process of convergence between
Member States set in place by the enlargement towards
the east) was identified in an earlier study, although in
this case growing inequality levels from 2009 were
reported as a result of the crisis (Dauderstädt and
Keltek, 2014). The same pattern was reflected in a
recent study from Eurofound (2015), which described a
reduction in EU-wide wage inequality before the crisis
driven by a between-country convergence; this
convergence process came to a halt at the onset of the
crisis, while within-country inequalities tended to
increase.3
This report builds on Eurofound’s recent work on wage
inequality (Eurofound, 2015) but widens the focus to
include all sources of income in order to map income
inequality patterns in recent years against the
background of the Great Recession and the forces that
have shaped them. In doing so, it provides an updated
picture on income inequality and the reasons behind its
evolution across Member States that can be compared
to that provided up to the emergence of the crisis by the
two abovementioned studies from the OECD (OECD,
2008, 2011).
Literature review
3 An even more recent study identifies a negative impact of the crisis on EU wages, larger than the one typically identified when national account figures are
used, which results from the highly uneven impact of the crisis in the core and the periphery (Brandolini and Rosolia, 2015).
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This report represents an attempt to counter the lack of
studies on EU-wide inequality and on the impact of the
recent crisis on income inequality levels by providing an
updated picture of trends from a European perspective.
It not only maps inequality trends in household
disposable income, but also in the different sources of
income. In addition, it analyses the role played by
changes in unemployment, the family pooling of
resources or the redistribution carried out by the
welfare state in income inequality patterns. 
Defining the inequality
framework 
The framework used to study inequality covers different
income measures, starting from monthly full-time
equivalent labour earnings and adding extra sources of
income gradually until the final measure of household
disposable income is constructed (see Figure 1). This
framework is similar but not identical to the one used by
recent comparable OECD reports (OECD, 2008, 2011).4
The following income measures were used in this report
as well as the main factors to be taken into account for
each of them.
Monthly labour income among the
workforce
This initial measure considers cash income originated
from work. As defined by the International Labour
Organization (ILO), earnings are the employee’s
remuneration for time worked or work done, together
with remuneration for time not worked, such as annual
vacations and other paid leave or holidays.5 This report
uses the term labour income because it covers labour
income from salaried employment as well as from
self-employment and because it is the term used in the
European Survey on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC), the data source of this study (explained
below). 
Three different versions of this measure are used. 
Monthly full-time equivalent labour income among
employees: This considers only wages among
employees adjusted for part time so that inequalities
can only be the result of differentials in hourly pay and
not working hours.
Monthly full-time equivalent labour income among
workers: This still adjusts for part time, but adds self-
employed and their labour income to the picture.
2 Inequality framework and
methodology used 
Figure 1: The components of income
4 The OECD covers wage levels differently, focusing on full-time workers and using different measures across countries (hourly, weekly, monthly earnings), so
that estimated inequality levels are more useful for studying trends over time than to be compared between countries. The description of wage inequality
mainly relies on a ratio comparing the earnings of the top and bottom decile (OECD, 2008). As is the case in this study, income from self-employment is
considered together with wages before moving to the household level in the most recent OECD report (OECD, 2011), but it was introduced when moving
from household earnings to household market income (together with capital) in the first report (OECD, 2008).
5 The full ILO definition reads: ‘Earnings (wages and salaries) is the concept of earnings as applied in wages statistics, relates to remuneration in cash and in
kind paid employees for time worked or work done together with remuneration for time not worked, such as annual vacation and other paid leave or
holidays. Earnings exclude employers’ contributions in respect of their employees paid to social security and pension schemes and also the benefits
received by employees under these schemes. Earnings also exclude severance and termination pay.’
Monthly labour income
among employees
(full-time equivalent)
Monthly labour income
among workers
(full-time equivalent)
Monthly labour income
among employees
(not full-time equivalent)
Annual labour
income
Household annual
labour income
Household
disposable income
Household market
income
Among active individuals
Among all individuals
Individual level Household level
Self-employment
Working time
Unemployment
Family-
pooling
Capital and
private transfers
Welfare state’s taxes
and benefits
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Monthly labour income among workers: This refers to
the monthly labour earnings of workers, without
adjusting for hours worked.
Annual labour income among individuals
This is an unadjusted measure of labour income earned
over the whole year, including both income from
employment and from self-employment. The difference
from the previous measure is that labour income is
considered over the 12 months of the year, including
months not worked (and therefore with zero labour
income), even for those permanently not employed over
the year (which will get therefore a final value of zero in
this measure). 
This indicator will be considered for two different
populations.
Annual labour income among active individuals: This
adds those currently unemployed to the picture and
therefore it includes individuals with no labour income.
Inequality levels will increase notably depending on
unemployment rates.
Annual labour income among all working-age
individuals: This adds those currently inactive to the
picture and further increases the possibility of including
individuals with no labour income. Inequality levels will
increase even further and this will be highly influenced
by the inactivity rates.
Annual labour income among households
This measure adds together the annual labour income
earned by all the members in the household and then
redistributes it among them according to an
equivalence scale (more on this later). This will
significantly reduce the observed levels of inequality in
the previous step.
Market income among households
This measure adds the income from capital and also
private transfers between households. Inequalities are
expected to be higher since capital is generally more
unevenly distributed than labour income (the effect of
private transfers is less clear).
Household disposable income
This measure takes into account the effects of the
welfare state through the tax and benefit system. Since
the welfare state redistributes income across
individuals and families in a generally progressive way,
inequalities should be notably lower than in the
previous measure.
Data source
The limited availability of microdata until recently may
explain the scarcity of inequality studies carried out at
an EU-wide level. The EU-SILC is the only large-scale
European survey that presently permits a comparative
analysis on income inequality across Member States to
be conducted. EU-SILC is a database on income,
poverty, social exclusion and living conditions in the EU,
coordinated by Eurostat, with data drawn from different
sources at the national level. This report uses EU-SILC
data to analyse trends in income distribution over the
period 2005–2014 (income referring to 2004–2013),
which is available for 24 EU countries (all EU Member
States except Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and Romania).
The EU-SILC is a survey conducted yearly of all private
households and their current members residing in the
territory of the countries at the time of data collection.
Nevertheless, the EU-SILC presents several limitations
to an ambitious analysis of inequalities across Member
States like the one conducted here. On the one hand, it
does not allow for a medium- and long-term analysis of
inequality since the data used in this report only cover
the period 2005 to 2014. On the other hand, it requires
several important caveats for the purposes of this
analysis. As a result of these methodological problems
posed by EU-SILC, the findings presented in this report
must be interpreted with care. These are some of the
caveats.
Gap between survey and income variables: There is a
one-year gap affecting the income variables: the survey
collects information about the respondents at the time
of the data collection (whether they are working, for
how many hours, the job characteristics and so on), but
the income variables refer to the previous year and
therefore may not be related to the current job. 
Income rather than wages: EU-SILC measures labour
income rather than wages. Labour income in the
EU‑SILC refers to overall income from work in the
previous calendar year, measured in gross terms (some
countries also provide net data). It does not necessarily
refer to particular jobs, since it measures any labour-
related income: an individual’s labour income may in
fact have originated from more than one job if the
respondent had different jobs in the previous year,
either successively (if they changed jobs) or
simultaneously (if they had multiple jobs). 
Imputation of responses: An additional problem with
the EU-SILC is that a significant proportion of the
responses are imputed (due to item non-response or
the information being collected indirectly) and the
variable flagging imputed values is not consistently
coded, making it difficult to evaluate its implications
(Brandolini et al, 2010). 
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
13
Variable quality between Member States: Some of the
income variables may be characterised by lower quality
in certain Member States during specific periods of time
(such as new Member States in the initial years of the
period). 
Operationalisation of variables
and methodological approach
Several methodological decisions had to be taken in
order to construct the variables capturing each of the
abovementioned components of income.
1. Monthly labour income
The original EU-SILC variable used in this report refers
to annual labour income, gross employee cash or near
cash income (that does not include social security
contributions) for employees and cash benefits or losses
from self-employment. The following formula is applied
to obtain the monthly full-time equivalent labour
income (based on Brandolini et al, 2010):
The monthly full-time equivalent labour earnings equals
the EU-SILC variable of annual cash earnings (in the
previous year) divided by respondents’ number of
months in full-time jobs over the same year, plus the
number of months in part-time jobs multiplied by a
country–sex specific ratio of median hours of work in
part-time jobs to median hours of work in full-time
jobs.6 This results in a full-time equivalent measure of
monthly labour income across all employees, including
part-time and temporary ones.7
The monthly full-time equivalent labour income among
employees only considers labour income from
dependent employment, while monthly full-time
equivalent labour income among workers includes
labour income from self-employment as well, for which
a specific ratio of median hours of work in part-time
jobs to median hours of work in full-time jobs is
calculated. The unadjusted measure of monthly labour
income among workers applies the same formula but
without adjusting for the months worked in part-time
employment. When an individual reports labour income
both from employment and self-employment, only the
larger amount will be considered. 
2. Annual labour income among individuals
This variable measures annual labour income without
adjusting for the months worked throughout the year
and allows for the possibility of some people having no
income for part or even the whole year. Two measures
are provided for different populations: (a) among active
people, which refers to all individuals who were active
(either worked or were unemployed) for at least one
month during the previous calendar year, even if they
did not receive labour income over part or all of the
year; and (b) among inactive people, which includes all
the working-age population, even if they did not receive
any labour income for being unemployed or inactive,
during part or all of the year. For individuals reporting
both employee and self-employment labour income
(only one of which was considered in the previous step),
both sources of income are added in this step. 
3. Annual labour income among households
This variable is constructed by adding the annual labour
incomes of all the working-age members of the
household and then dividing it by the equivalent
number of household members (which is the number of
household members adjusted by the OECD equivalence
scale; this takes into account all the members, not only
those of working age). Then, an identical share of the
pooled income is assigned to each of the household
members of working age.
4. Market income among households
This variable adds capital income and private transfers
to the household: income from rents; income from
interest, dividends and similar; private transfers
received by young people under 16 years of age living in
the household; private inter-household cash transfers
received; minus private inter-household cash transfers
paid. EU-SILC data present important limitations for the
study of capital income, as it is quite likely that it
significantly underestimates the capital income earned
by households and individuals. Private transfers
between households play an important role and their
nature is different from that of capital from
investments. These private transfers between
households may be seen as an extension of the role of
families in pooling resources. 
Inequality framework and methodology used
Monthly ft eq.labour income =
annual cash earnings
months in ft jobs +(months in pt jobs*( pt ratio))ft
6 For each country and year, a ratio is calculated dividing the median hours of work of part-time employees by those of full-time employees. A separate ratio
is calculated across men and women. 
7 A potential bias is prevented by adjusting the values of workers who hold more than one job by multiplying the labour income for a ratio of the hours worked
in the first job to the total hours of work in all jobs so that the labour income of those having more than one job is reduced (proportionally to the number of
hours worked outside the first job). This is applied to the two measures on full-time equivalent monthly earnings (since the objective is comparing
inequalities in wages, even if the self-employed are included in the latter measure) but not to the unadjusted measure (since the objective is comparing
inequalities in labour income). Moreover, an additional adjustment is made to the measure on monthly full-time equivalent wages among employees, for
which all the abnormally low values found below a threshold of half the minimum wage of the country concerned in a particular year are eliminated (for
further details, see Eurofound, 2015).
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5. Disposable income among households
This variable reflects the subtraction of income by taxes
and the addition of benefits carried out by the welfare
system. The following taxes and benefits are included in
EU-SILC: taxes on income and social contributions;
taxes on wealth; unemployment benefits; old-age
benefits; survivor’s benefits; sickness benefits; disability
benefits; education-related allowances; family/children-
related allowances; housing allowances; and benefits
related to social exclusion not elsewhere classified.
Other important issues to be taken into account
regarding the methodology used in this study are the
following.
Unit of analysis: The analysis will be performed among
individuals between 15 and 65 years of age. This is
straightforward for variables 1 and 2, which are
calculated at the individual level. Variables 3 to 5 are
also calculated at the individual level by taking the
income at the household level and splitting it according
to the OECD equivalence scale among the members of
the household. Although the inequality analysis only
focuses on people of working age, the rest of the
population will affect the results indirectly when
household-pooled income is studied (since part of the
total household income will be assigned to the younger
and older members of the household, even if they are
not included in the sample). For the household market
and disposable income, the incomes of people not of
working age will be included as well.
Income levels: For the inequality analysis conducted at
the EU level in Chapter 3, income levels across countries
are expressed in euro adjusted by Eurostat’s purchasing
power standard (PPS), which makes them comparable
across countries by taking into account differences in
the costs of living. For the inequality analysis at the
country level in Chapter 5, Gini indices are not affected
by whether or not PPS are used. The information on
income levels across countries presented in Chapter 6
will use data on national currencies so that changes in
the value of the currencies in those countries outside
the euro area do not affect the picture. Moreover,
information on income levels is always presented in real
terms by adjusting for inflation.
Treatment of negative values: Although uncommon,
negative values may exist across all the income
variables defined in this report except that of the
monthly wage among employees. But most of the cases
are concentrated in three components of income:
income from self-employment; private transfers paid to
other households; and taxes paid. In case there are no
other sources of income (probably due to under-
reporting in most cases) to compensate for these
negative values, they will translate into negative values
in the final measures of income inequality used here.
There are three ways to treat these cases: leave them
untreated, convert them into zeros or drop them from
the analysis. Table A1 in the annex shows that the level
of inequality (for household disposable income,
although it would also apply to the different measures
of income) is highest when negative values are included,
declining slightly if converted to zero and a bit further if
dropped from the analysis. Differences are generally
negligible (slightly more significant in some countries,
such as Germany, Denmark, Spain or the Netherlands)
and this report will follow the intermediate approach by
converting negative values into zeros and keeping all
the observations. The findings and interpretations in
this report are not generally affected by this decision.
Graphical representation of income data: As explained
earlier, all the EU-SILC’s income variables refer to the
previous calendar year covered by the survey,
introducing a one-year gap between the income
measures used in this report and the year of the survey.
This one-year gap is reflected when income data are
compared to other variables from different data
sources, such as employment variables or GDP. While
this would offer a justification to change the reference
year for the income data and show it accordingly in the
graphs presented in this report, it has been decided to
keep the reference year to that of the survey. The main
reason is because the EU-SILC’s information on the
labour market status on the current year is used to
construct the variable on monthly wages among
employees so that the compositional effects affecting
the workforce are taken into account adequately.
Therefore, to maintain consistency with this measure
(and with any other non-income variables from the
EU-SILC used in the analysis), the current year of the
survey is the one shown when representing the data,
even if they refer to income obtained during the
previous year. This report will use EU-SILC data for the
period 2005–2014 while referring to income data for the
period 2004–2013.
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
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One of the main contributions of this report is to
provide an analysis of recent income inequality trends
from an EU-wide perspective, considering income levels
across countries as part of a single EU income
distribution and differentiating developments within
and between Member States. There are few analyses of
income inequalities from an EU-wide perspective in the
literature and even fewer that map trends from the
onset of the crisis. Nevertheless, despite the fact that
European labour markets and their regulating
institutions remain essentially national, providing a
European-wide narrative on the evolution of income
inequalities in the EU and across countries and income
disparities between countries is highly relevant. This is
especially the case against the background set by recent
years, which was initially characterised by a process of
deepening European integration from the creation of
the euro and the enlargement of EU membership
towards the east and, more recently, by financial and
sovereign debt crises that are placing the EU under
considerable strain.
Figure 2 provides an introductory picture of the
distribution of household disposable income for the EU
as a whole, broken down by Member States, in 2014
(income referring to 2013). It shows the percentage of
European people found across the different annual
income categories shown in the horizontal axis, which
refers to euros adjusted by PPS to take into account
differences in price levels across countries. Each bar
represents intervals of €1,000 of household disposable
income among working-age individuals. In other words,
around 4.5% of Europeans of working age have a
household disposable income between €10,000 and
€11,000 per year. Figure 2 shows that from this
perspective, the EU-wide income distribution is similar
to that of a country, with a large concentration of
people around mid to low income levels (between
€9,000 and €14,000) and a skew to the right, with a long
tail of some very high incomes.
The differences in household disposable income levels
between Member States are clearly reflected by the
positioning of countries in the graph. Eastern European
countries (and Mediterranean countries to a lesser
extent) are much more present in the bottom quintile,
corresponding to income levels below €9,000, while
EU15 countries account for almost all the people found
in the top quintile, corresponding to income levels
above €25,000.8 The people in the top 1% of the EU
income distribution earn more than €62,000. Most of
them are from France, the UK, Germany and Italy,
although information for top incomes drawn from the
EU-SILC needs to be interpreted with care.9 But even if
the countries occupy clearly different positions, there is
a significant degree of overlap in the national
distributions of income shown in Figure 2. For instance,
the countries that dominate the top quintile also have a
significant share of population in the lowest income
quintile. This important overlap simply reflects that the
dispersion of income within countries is much larger
than the dispersion between their average incomes and
it highlights the usefulness of an approach that
integrates both aspects, as presented in Figure 2. 
The notable redistribution carried out by the European
welfare states and its role in compressing the income
distribution is revealed when comparing the previous
picture with the household market income distribution
(in other words, eliminating the redistributing effect of
taxes and transfers; see Figure 3). This distribution is
much more scattered and polarised, with a big spike in
values around zero because of the existence of many
individuals and households with very little or no market
income (and which depend entirely on the welfare
system). According to the authors’ estimate, more than
10% of Europeans have market incomes below €1,000
PPP per year. These are most likely households where
all or most adult members are unemployed or inactive,
a phenomenon that affects all countries, as shown in
Figure 2. At the other extreme, the share of individuals
with market incomes above €62,000 PPP is multiplied
by 3. 
3 Income inequality from an
EU-wide perspective 
8 For a listing of the EU15 Member States, please refer to the table at the start of the report. 
9 The EU-SILC probably underestimates the upper income levels due to a poor coverage of the population at the very top of the distribution.
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The following section will analyse EU-wide inequality
patterns over time by using relative indicators of
inequality across different income sources. Gini indices
will describe the evolution of EU-wide inequalities,
while Theil indices will be used to analyse the extent to
which trends are driven by developments between or
within Member States. Finally, a map of income-level
developments will complete the picture of the impact of
the Great Recession on the distribution of income at the
EU level.
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Figure 2: EU-wide distribution by ranges of household disposable income in PPP euros, 2014 (%)
Source: EU-SILC.
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Figure 3: EU-wide distribution by ranges of household market income in PPP euros, 2014 (%)
Source: EU-SILC.
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Income inequalities before and
after the Great Recession
EU-wide inequalities – as measured by the Gini
index – vary strongly across the different income
variables, broadly in line with what would be expected
(see Table 2). Inequality levels are more subdued for
full-time equivalent wages and they progressively grow
when labour income from self-employment is added,
when labour earnings are not adjusted for part-time
work and especially when they are computed as annual
labour earnings among the active and the total
population due to the inclusion of people with no
labour earnings. Inequality levels are lowered by the
family pooling of income and by the action of the
welfare state.10
Interestingly, the levels of inequality are rather similar
for the initial measure of full-time equivalent wages
among employees and for the final measure of
household disposable income. EU-wide inequality in
final household disposable income as measured by the
Gini index is 0.336 in 2014 (income referring to 2013),
which is significantly lower than in the US, where it is
estimated at 0.390 in the same year according to the
OECD (based on the OECD Income Distribution
Database for the working age population, considered as
18–65 years).
Figure 4 shows inequality levels for those income
variables, reflecting some interesting divergences over
time. When the whole period 2005–2014 is considered
(referring to income over the period 2004–2013),
inequality levels have been reduced across all sources
of income, but this is due to developments at the
beginning of the period that have been reverted by the
emergence of the crisis. 
Two main insights emerge regarding the impact of the
Great Recession on inequality levels. First, the crisis
seemed to push inequalities upwards but outside the
labour market via rising unemployment, not through
widening pay differentials among the workforce.11
Inequalities bounce upwards from 2009 (income
referring to 2008) for all income measures, including the
active and the whole working age population, but they
remain stagnant or even continue to decline slightly for
the three measures of monthly earnings among the
workforce.  However, the magnitude of the increases
after 2009 is much less important than that of the
decreases registered before the crisis. The biggest
expansion of inequalities took place between 2009 and
2010, with more moderate developments since then.12
Income inequality from an EU-wide perspective
10 The effect of the family pooling of labour earnings and that of capital has been considered together under the variable of household market income. The
reason is that the inclusion of capital and private transfer has a rather negligible effect and moreover, contrary to what is expected, they slightly reduce
income inequalities. Chapter 5 will discuss this issue in detail, which in part reflects the poor measurement of capital income in the EU-SILC but also the fact
that capital income and private transfers are often received by people with no labour income. 
11 The three variables on labour earnings among the workforce show the same pattern over time, which is why only the unadjusted monthly earnings variable
is shown here.
12 It is important to remember that there is a one-year lag in the EU-SILC’s income data, so that EU-SILC data for 2010 refer in fact to income from 2009. This
explains why the notable employment corrections taking place in 2009 across most Member States mainly affect EU-SILC income data in 2010. Nevertheless,
it has been decided to maintain the year of the EU-SILC data as the reference year (instead of the previous one to which its income data refer) because the
employment structure and the potential impact of compositional effects refer to that year (see the methodology in Chapter 2).
Table 2: Gini indicator for several income variables, for EU overall      
Reference 2005 2006 2008 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Monthly wages, FTE (employees) 0.376 0.367 0.360 0.356 0.346 0.352 0.352 0.346 0.346 0.344
Monthly labour income, FTE
(workers) 
0.413 0.406 0.398 0.396 0.384 0.390 0.388 0.381 0.382 0.381
Monthly labour income (workers) 0.419 0.413 0.408 0.406 0.395 0.400 0.400 0.394 0.394 0.394
Annual labour income (active) 0.492 0.482 0.474 0.467 0.464 0.473 0.477 0.477 0.480 0.481
Annual labour income (all) 0.632 0.619 0.613 0.603 0.601 0.607 0.608 0.605 0.607 0.605
Household market income 0.493 0.480 0.474 0.463 0.459 0.469 0.471 0.470 0.474 0.472
Household disposable income 0.355 0.344 0.343 0.337 0.330 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.334 0.336
Note: FTE = full-time equivalent.
Source: EU-SILC.
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Second, the roles of the family and the state in
cushioning income inequalities seem to influence the
results in an opposite direction. On the one hand, some
erosion in the inequality-reduction role of the family
pooling of income could have occurred from the onset
of the crisis, as suggested by the fact that the increase in
inequalities is larger for household market income than
for annual labour earnings among the whole
population. On the other hand, the role of the welfare
state in reducing market income inequalities seems to
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Figure 4: EU-wide inequalities for different income indicators (Gini indices)      
Source: EU-SILC and LFS (unemployment rate).
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Figure 5: Theil indicators for several income variables (EU, 2005–2014)       
Note: FTE = full-time equivalent
Source: EU-SILC and LFS (unemployment rate).
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have been reinforced from the onset of the crisis
(probably because of the activation of automatic
stabilisers such as unemployment insurance), since it
cushioned the surge in market income inequality. While
inequalities in household market income grew by
almost 3% between 2009 and 2014 (income referring to
2008 and 2013 respectively), inequalities household
disposable income rose by less than 2%. Nevertheless,
household disposable income inequalities increased in
the last year for which data are available, while
household market income inequalities declined, which
may suggest a deterioration in the redistributive
capacity of the welfare state in some countries
experiencing continuing economic hardship. 
Inequality developments and
convergence between countries
An alternative measure of inequality is provided by the
Theil index, whose decomposable nature is of great
interest for this report because it can be used to
describe how EU-wide inequality has been shaped by
inequality developments within countries (the within
component) and trends in income levels between
countries (the between component).13
Data for the Theil index across all income variables
show that although EU-wide inequality is mainly
accounted for by within-country inequality, the
between component has played a significant role in the
recent evolution because of an important process of
convergence between Member States (see Figure 5).14
The decline in EU-wide inequality before the crisis is
almost entirely explained by income convergence
between countries, even if within-country
developments generally pushed inequalities downward
as well. From 2009 (income referring to 2008), the
interruption of this process of income convergence
between countries is also key to understanding why
within-country developments push EU-wide inequality
levels up.15
Although this picture applies rather generally to all
income variables, some nuances are worth noting. First,
rising unemployment probably played a key role in
pushing market income inequalities up and also in
reversing the process of income convergence between
countries. This is reflected by the fact that the process
of convergence continues (although at a slower pace)
for monthly earnings among the workforce, but a
divergence between countries emerges from the onset
of the crisis in income levels among the population.
Second, European welfare states partially offset the
effects of rising unemployment in income inequalities
as well as in income convergence. This explains why in
the case of household disposable income, as opposed
to household market income, the increase in within-
country inequalities is relatively modest and the income
convergence between countries gets interrupted but
not reverted. 
Impact of the crisis on real
income levels
A comprehensive picture of the effects of the Great
Recession also needs to consider the evolution of
income levels, which may have suffered a downward
correction that is not necessarily captured by the
relative indicators of inequality presented so far. Real
income levels for the EU as a whole are calculated by
adjusting values by inflation and by PPS across
countries.16
Figure 6 classifies the European working age population
by deciles of household disposable income distribution
and then shows how their income levels (by source)
have evolved (income data referring to one year before
to that indicated in the figure). Before the crisis, real
income grew most strongly at the lower deciles,
suggesting a strong reduction of overall EU inequality,
particularly in the bottom half of the distribution. This
occurs for all sources of income and is consistent with
the previously discussed results for the Gini and Theil
indices. This process, of course, has a strong between-
country component. Although a significant overlap in
the positioning of countries occurs in the EU-wide
distribution (as was discussed in Figure 2, which shows
the distribution of national populations that underlie
Figure 6), lower income countries are much more
present at the bottom deciles of the EU-wide
distribution (these are mainly eastern European
countries); the process of income catch-up in these
countries explains to a large extent the observed
expansion of income for the lower deciles in the EU as
a whole. 
Income inequality from an EU-wide perspective
13 The Theil index is characterised by lower numerical values of inequality and more sensitivity to changes over time than the Gini index. 
14 The added value of the truly EU-wide approach adopted in this report is that it takes into account between-country developments in income levels, while
Eurostat’s data on inequality levels for the EU-aggregate are only the result of inequality trends within countries.
15 Changes in the within-country component for the EU-wide Theil index hide significant cross-country paths in inequalities, as will be shown in Chapter 5.
16 Since inflation differentials across countries are already taken into account by PPS, all income levels across countries have been adjusted by the general
inflation rate of the EU28 to obtain the incomes in real terms for the EU as a whole.
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The Great Recession had a notable impact on income
levels, more obvious than was the case with income
inequalities. There was a significant decline of real
income across most of the distribution and across all
sources of income. The decline tended to be stronger
and more generalised in the first two years of the crisis
but continued until 2014. The contrast with previous
results (using relative inequality indices) is important:
the impact of the crisis was generally stronger in terms
of income levels (with a generalised decrease in real
terms, which is more significant for those with low
levels of income) than in terms of relative income
inequality (with a moderate increase after 2009, as
previously shown). 
Two further details regarding the impact of the crisis on
income levels are in line with what was said earlier for
income inequalities. First, declining employment
emerges again as a key force behind changes, since
income measures extending beyond workers suffer a
correction that is both larger and more unequal (being
much more significant for low income levels). Second,
the role of the welfare state in cushioning market forces
is again evident in the comparison between the
evolution of market and household disposable income:
the downwards correction in household disposable
income levels is moderated significantly by the effect of
taxes and transfers as well as the unevenness of the
effect across deciles (the line is significantly flatter). 
The key role played by employment turbulence in
driving movements in income levels is further suggested
by Figure 7, which shows changes (in percentage points)
in the share of employed and unemployed people over
the different income deciles.17 It shows that the
convergence in income levels that took place in the
early years of the period is linked to a process of
employment creation that benefited those at the
bottom of the income distribution relatively more, while
the process of divergence in income levels from the
onset of the crisis is associated with rapidly growing
unemployment levels affecting those at the bottom
much more. The lower income population is affected by
higher unemployment rates, which has clearly
intensified since the onset of the crisis, especially during
the initial years of the financial crisis.
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Figure 6: Average yearly growth in income levels by household disposable income deciles (%)       
Note: Data refer to average yearly growth rates during each of the three subperiods (income data referring to one year earlier than the one
indicated); FTE = full-time equivalent.
Source: EU-SILC.
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17 Contrary to what occurs with income, EU-SILC’s data on employment refer to the actual year indicated in the figure. This is the reason why the three
subperiods have been adjusted accordingly so that they are comparable with those used in Figure 6. 
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Summary
This chapter has discussed the impact of the Great
Recession on EU-wide income inequalities and income
levels, and with respect to the process of income
convergence taking place between Member States.
Before the crisis, EU-wide income inequalities declined,
mostly as a result of a process of convergence in income
levels between Member States. This convergence was
due to more solid progress at the bottom of the EU
income distribution, where lower income countries are
more present.
The crisis pushed EU-wide inequalities upwards but
outside labour markets due to declining employment
levels, while labour earnings inequalities among the
workforce continued to narrow very moderately. After
2009 (income referring to 2008), EU-wide income
inequalities increased as a result of an expansion of
inequalities within countries and to a halt in the process
of income convergence between countries. This seems
linked to large drops in employment at the bottom of
the income distribution after 2008, a development that
affected many countries but to different extents, and
therefore contributed to a between-country divergence. 
European welfare states partially cushioned the effect
of growing market income inequalities, since household
disposable income inequalities increased more
moderately than market incomes. Nevertheless,
developments in the most recent period suggest a
certain deterioration in the capacity of welfare states to
counterbalance growing market inequalities. This
seems to also be the case for families, whose role in
reducing income inequalities by pooling resources at
the household level seems to have eroded since the
onset of the crisis. Nevertheless, these EU-wide
developments may be the result of different trends
across Member States, which will be explored in the
next chapters.
Income inequality from an EU-wide perspective
Figure 7: Change in the share of employed and unemployed people by household disposable income deciles,
24 EU Member States (percentage points)       
Source: EU-SILC.
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The previous chapter highlighted the key role played by
between-country developments in explaining recent
trends in EU-wide inequalities. Before the crisis, the
reductions in EU-wide inequalities across the different
sources of income were driven by a marked decline of
the income differentials between countries.
Nevertheless, this process of convergence has been
halted since the onset of the crisis across all sources of
income (although to a lower extent for earnings among
the workforce, as shown in Figure 5).
This chapter provides a more detailed analysis of the
process of income convergence between Member States
using country-level data on average household
disposable income from the EU-SILC (see Figure 8). This
is complemented with data from the annual
macroeconomic database of the European Commission
(AMECO), with two main objectives: first, to link
developments of income levels and between-country
inequalities with GDP, which is the most frequently used
indicator of economic progress; and second, adding
complementary data from AMECO on the gross
disposable income of households, to test the
robustness of the EU-SILC figures and evaluate longer
time trends in household disposable income levels. 
Even if the EU-SILC’s average household disposable
income and AMECO’s GDP per capita refer to different
concepts, a comparison between both variables shows
similar developments, indicating that the process of
4 Income convergence between
Member States 
Figure 8: Average household disposable income, real GDP per capita and gross disposable income of
households       
Note: Countries are ranked by the magnitude of the growth rate of the average household disposable income over the whole period. There is a
one year-gap in EU-SILC income data, which refers to the previous year.
Source: EU-SILC for average household disposable income and AMECO for GDP per capita and gross disposable income of households in euros.
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convergence between Member States discussed in the
previous chapter is mainly driven by economic growth.
A strong upwards income convergence process takes
place over the period, mainly driven by the catch-up of
eastern European countries, although stagnating
income levels in Continental and Scandinavian
countries also contributed (in the UK income levels even
declined, a development partially explained by currency
depreciation).18 This process of convergence was
notable before the Great Recession, but it has been
interrupted by it due to average household disposable
income and GDP levels declining more significantly in
peripheral countries than in the core of Europe. 
Despite this similarity in the overall picture provided by
the authors’ measure of household disposable income
and AMECO’s GDP per capita, there are some
differences. The convergence in average household
disposable income levels is stronger during the initial
years of the period and is less abruptly interrupted from
the onset of the crisis than in the case of relative levels
of GDP per capita. The strength of the process of catch-
up in eastern European countries is more significant in
average household disposable income than in relative
levels of GDP per capita. At the same time, the
deterioration of relative levels in some high-income
Member States (Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands or Ireland) is stronger when using average
household disposable income levels.
This points to the importance of monitoring well-being
in European societies by using both aggregate
economic indicators such as GDP, and a wider range of
indicators that provide a more direct estimate of
people’s prosperity, such as household disposable
income. Box 1 discusses the different picture obtained
by using household disposable income and GDP per
capita when assessing the impact of the crisis. The latter
widely used measure of economic development gives a
much more positive picture, which may conceal part of
the drop in income levels in the periphery and
stagnation in the core of Europe in recent years. 
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
18 For details of the country groupings used in this report, please see the table at the start of this report. 
19 The mean was used in Figure 8 in order to map the process of convergence in income levels between countries explaining the results of the Theil analysis
covered in the previous chapter. In order to provide a comparison with trends in GDP, Figure 9 uses the median income instead, which is more stable than
the average income since the latter is more sensitive to outliers in the distribution of income (which can be problematic given the issues of precision that
may arise when measuring income in surveys). 
Rising inequality levels and stagnating incomes among large segments of society are receiving increased
attention by academics and policymakers across developed economies. Against this background, growing
concerns are emerging with respect to the use of GDP per capita as the main measure used to monitor living
standards and economic developments generally (Stiglitz et al, 2009). Empirical studies covering data for more
than three decades have shown that the average yearly growth rate of GDP per capita has been significantly
larger than that of the median equivalised household disposable income (Nolan et al, 2016).
Figure 9 shows a comparison between the impact of the crisis as measured by GDP per capita and by our
indicator of household disposable income (using the median instead of the average in each country).19
In this case, both measures are expressed in national currencies (instead of in PPP-adjusted euro and in reference
to the EU) because the main objective here is not monitoring convergence trends, but assessing the impact of the
crisis in each country. 
The data reveal a downwards correction in the median household disposable income from the onset of the crisis.
It declines in two-thirds of the countries between 2008 and 2014, mainly in the European periphery,
Mediterranean countries and Ireland. Nevertheless, household disposable income levels also fell in the UK and
some Continental countries (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and France), while they remain rather
stagnant in the other core Member States from the Continental and Scandinavian regions (except Sweden). 
Box 1: Household disposable income and GDP per capita throughout
the crisis: A comparison
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Income convergence between Member States
The main insight from the comparison presented here is that the downwards correction in household disposable
income levels caused by the crisis is not evident in some countries if GDP per capita is used instead. This is
certainly the case in some important core Member States, such as Germany. It is also the case in several of the
countries most severely hit by the crisis, such as Ireland, Spain and Greece, as well as the Baltic states, even if the
median household disposable income ends up growing relatively more between 2011 and 2014 in the latter group
of countries.
Therefore, GDP per capita may fail to capture a deterioration of living standards in some European societies that
seems better reflected by the decline in median household disposable incomes. Nevertheless, this is not always
the case, since the opposite development occurs in some CEE countries (and in the Baltic states, if the whole
period is considered) as well as France and Sweden, where the household disposable income grew relatively
more than GDP per capita. 
The discrepancies between both indicators may be due to a combination of factors. Nolan et al (2016) identified
some of them: 
£ price adjustments (since GDP is adjusted by the GDP deflator and household income by the consumer price
index); 
£ the national income concept (since GDP refers to domestic output and household income to income inflows
to resident households); 
Figure 9: Median household disposable income and GDP per capita (indices)     
Note: Both variables are expressed in national currencies and have been adjusted by inflation levels (constant in 2010). Countries are
ranked by the growth rate of the median household disposable income between 2008 and 2014. There is a one year-gap in EU-SILC
income data, which refers to the previous year. 
Source: EU-SILC for median household disposable income, AMECo for GDP and LFS for unemployment rate.
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Figure 8 also provides figures on the gross disposable
income of households from national accounts (AMECO),
which has not been used to assess convergence
between Member States because it cannot be directly
compared to the EU-SILC’s average household
disposable income.20 Nevertheless, this variable is
useful because it provides two main insights that
reinforce the main narrative that has been provided by
EU-SILC data. First, it shows that the described trends
across countries were ongoing from at least the early
2000s: a significant growth in household gross
disposable income occurred in eastern Europe, while
growth was more modest in the EU15 generally. Second,
AMECO’s data on both household gross disposable
income and GDP per capita suggest that the described
picture would be further confirmed by the inclusion of
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
£ data sources (since GDP arising from national accounts and household income typically come from surveys); 
£ household size (given that GDP is divided by the total population and household income is divided by –
equivalised – household size); 
£ levels of inequality (since growth in median household disposable income will be more modest than in GDP
per capita or average household income if incomes grow relatively faster at the top of the income
distribution).
20 AMECO’s variable refers to both households and non-profit institutions serving households. It does not provide an average per household, but rather an
aggregate magnitude at the country level resulting from adding disposable income among all households. Moreover, the variable is not fit to adequately
evaluate convergence because it is expressed in levels of euros (instead of in PPP-adjusted euros) and moreover not expressed in relation to the EU level (as
is the case with the variable from EU-SILC).
Figure 10: Development in average household disposable income (in PPP, 24 EU Member States (EU24) = 100)       
Source: EU-SILC.
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those Member States not available in the EU-SILC:
notable progress generally occurred in Bulgaria, Croatia
and Romania, while GDP per capita data reflect a more
moderate (only from 2007) convergence in the
Mediterranean country of Malta. 
A detailed analysis of EU-SILC data on average
household disposable income reveals a more nuanced
picture of the trends in income levels across countries
behind the process of convergence described earlier.
Figure 10 reflects the income catch-up process before
the crisis (between 2005 and 2009, income levels
referring to 2005–2008), with household disposable
income levels growing much more where they were
initially lowest, mainly in eastern European countries.
This process could have been stronger if income levels
had progressed among the lower income Mediterranean
countries, but this mainly occurred in Spain.21 Above
the EU average, incomes declined notably in the two
countries where they were initially highest (Luxembourg
and the UK) and they declined slightly, remained stable
or progressed rather modestly across many Continental
and Scandinavian countries.
A decomposition of the EU-level Theil index carried out
in the previous chapter showed that the crisis
interrupted this process of convergence. This is clearly
reflected in the trends between 2009 and 2011 depicted
in Figure 10 (income referring to 2008–2010) due to
income levels being much more resilient in the
European core (except in Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) and declining significantly in many
countries in the European periphery, mainly in some
Mediterranean and Baltic countries, although
household income continued to progress in some other
CEE countries. Nevertheless, in a much milder and less
generalised form, the process of catch-up seems to have
started recovering somewhat between 2011 and 2014
(income referring to 2010–2013), with some expansion
of income levels in some of the eastern European
Member states (notably in the Baltic states), while they
continue to remain rather stagnant in most core
Member States. However, income levels continued
declining in Mediterranean countries until the most
recent period (very significantly in Greece).
Summary
This chapter has discussed the interrupted process of
convergence in levels of household disposable income
that has taken place in Member States between 2005
and 2014 (although national accounts data show it
started from at least the early 2000s). This initial
convergence prior to the crisis (between 2005 and 2009,
income referring to 2004–2008) was due mainly to a
process of relative income catch-up in CEE countries as
well as income deterioration or stagnation in several
high-income countries in the European core, such as the
UK, Germany and other Continental countries. The
Mediterranean region failed generally to converge even
in the initial years. 
The process of convergence was intense before the
crisis and drove a significant decline in EU-wide
inequalities, but was interrupted by the crisis due to a
strong negative development in the European periphery
in many eastern European countries (especially the
Baltic states) and many Mediterranean countries, while
relative income levels were much more resilient in the
European core. Nevertheless, average household
disposable income levels are slowly starting to grow
again and catching up in the most recent years in many
eastern European countries (especially the Baltic
states). Mediterranean countries continue to suffer a
downwards correction. 
Some of these developments are not always evident
when using other indicators of economic prosperity,
such as GDP per capita, which provide a more benign
picture of the impact of the crisis among some
European societies than household disposable income
levels (in Germany, for instance) and as well in some of
those countries most severely hit by the crisis (such as
Spain, Greece, Ireland or the Baltic states), although the
opposite occurs in other cases. This underlines the
importance of using a wider set of indicators than GDP
when monitoring developments of economic progress
and well-being in Europe.
Income convergence between Member States
21 Moreover, the notable expansion of income levels in Spain is largely due to considerable progress in the year 2009 due to data revision in that year. The
progress was much more modest between 2005 and 2008. 
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This chapter complements the picture on developments
between countries provided in the previous chapter by
analysing inequality developments within EU Member
States between 2005 and 2014 (income data referring to
2004–2013). It maps cross-country trends in income
inequalities for different sources of income and
analyses how they have been shaped amid the Great
Recession by forces such as employment turbulence or
changes in the capacity of families and welfare states to
cushion income shocks.
This chapter provides an update to the picture
previously provided by similar comparative studies,
particularly some recent OECD studies (OECD, 2008,
2011), by mapping developments both before and after
the economic crisis. The results of this analysis show
that inequalities in household disposable income have
increased during this period in two-thirds of the
countries, confirming the upwards trend in income
inequality levels affecting many Member States that was
identified in the abovementioned OECD publications.
Nevertheless, while those earlier studies pointed to
wage inequalities as the key driver behind growing
income inequalities, these findings show that in the
crisis it was declining employment levels and not
widening pay differentials among workers that drove
inequality developments, even though the actions of
welfare states have cushioned growing inequalities in
market income. This pattern is especially evident in the
European periphery, where both unemployment and
income inequalities grew most rapidly. The results from
this report and those from the OECD studies mentioned
can be seen as complementary, since the latter look at
long-term trends over several decades while the current
report covers a short-time span crucially influenced by
the Great Recession and the effects of rising
unemployment levels.
The first section of this chapter provides an introductory
picture of economic and labour market developments
across Member States in recent years and introduces a
regional map of inequality across Member States. The
rest of the chapter analyses the evolution of inequalities
over time for each of the different sources of income,
following the framework laid out in the methodological
section. 
Inequalities and the uneven
impact of the crisis
The results for EU-wide inequalities presented in
Chapter 3 showed that within-country inequalities
tended to decline in the initial years of the period until
they were pushed upwards from the onset of the crisis.
The country-level inequality developments to be
presented in this chapter generally confirm this picture
by showing that income inequalities behaved counter-
cyclically, declining before the crisis in many countries
and then moving generally upwards from the onset of
the crisis. 
This counter-cyclicality of income inequalities needs to
be put in the context of general developments in
economic growth and employment. On the one hand,
the downward trend in income inequalities before the
crisis would be consistent with a period of economic
growth and job creation. Nevertheless, it is important to
stress that the evolution of income inequalities prior to
the crisis covered in this report is not representative of
the longer-term trends that seem to be affecting
Member States in the last two or three decades and that
point to growing income inequality in many cases,
though to different extents and with important
exceptions (see Box 2).
On the other hand, growing income inequalities across
many Member States since the onset of the crisis would
be consistent with a time of economic distress and
employment corrections depriving many people of
labour income, especially in those countries most
severely hit by the crisis. Box 3 provides a summary of
this economic and employment context.
5 Comparative analysis of inequality
trends within Member States 
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The analysis in Chapter 3 of EU-wide household disposable income inequality showed that within-country
inequalities were somewhat pushed upwards since the onset of the crisis, reversing a previous declining trend
(although modest as well) in the period 2005–2009. These earlier trends were surely influenced by the intense
economic growth characterising most of the decade of the 2000s before the emergence of the Great Recession;
they may therefore paint a misleading picture of what had been the most common patterns in income
inequalities across Member States in previous decades.
A look into longer-term patterns is possible, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which maps
household disposable income inequality across many Member States using a longer time span, in some cases
going back the 1960s and 1970s (see Figure 11).22 Two main insights emerge from the data that are relevant for
the purposes of this report.
LIS data do confirm a trend towards higher levels of income inequalities across many Member States in recent
past decades. Scandinavian countries register rising inequalities from the 1980s (in Sweden) and 1990s (Denmark
and Finland), reverting the declines in income inequality taking place up to the early 1980s in Sweden and the
mid-1990s in Denmark. All Continental countries except France registered growing income inequalities over time,
even though the time periods covered vary and opposite trends may coexist in different subperiods (particularly
in the Netherlands). Eastern European countries (except Hungary and Estonia) reflect growing income
inequalities from the 1990s. The UK registers a persistent trend towards higher income inequality levels from the
early 1980s, matched only by that in the US. 
Box 2: Growing inequalities in the long term? 
22 LIS data on household disposable income inequalities are not directly comparable to the data presented in other parts of this report, not only due to the
fact that they originate from different datasets and cover different concepts (for instance, LIS data refer to monetary and non-monetary income). There are
also some methodological variations: LIS estimates cover the whole population and the income is made equivalent by dividing at the household level by
the square root of the number of household members. 
Figure 11: Household disposable income inequality (Gini index)     
Source: Luxembourg Income Study database and LFS (unemployment rate).
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Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
However, this trend towards higher inequality levels is not as strong as often assumed and it is certainly not
universal. Significant reductions in inequalities are registered as well from the second half of the 1980s in France
and from the end of the 1990s in Ireland. Declines in income inequalities occur from the end of the 1990s and
early 2000s in Hungary and Estonia respectively, perhaps reversing the previous increases associated with their
transition to a market economy (something that can be observed in the Hungarian case using LIS data). Finally,
Mediterranean countries are characterised by rather mixed trends: a pattern of decline seems to emerge in the
1980s, which was reversed in the 1990s but re-emerged in the second half of the 1990s and the 2000s, before the
crisis pushed inequalities up again. 
It is important to note that with some exceptions, such as the UK, cyclical variations in income inequalities across
countries broadly follow changes in the unemployment rate, reflecting a counter-cyclical pattern of income
inequalities over the business cycle.23
23 Moreover, it seems there is a certain trend towards convergence in inequality levels between countries, since income inequalities increased in some of those
countries where they were initially lowest and vice versa. This will be explored later for the countries covered in this report.
24 For a definition of country groupings, please see the table at the start of the report, or on p. xxx in Chapter 5.
Economic and labour market trends during the period between 2005 and 2014 were strongly shaped by the
impact of the Great Recession. Before 2009, GDP and employment levels expanded across all Member States,
while the unemployment rate was reduced almost everywhere. From 2009, GDP per capita levels were pushed
downwards and are still below pre-crisis levels in more than half of the EU28. This unleashed notable turbulence
in labour markets, with general corrections in employment levels (which are still below pre-crisis levels in more
than half the countries) and unemployment rates moving upwards in almost all countries (see Figure 12).
Nevertheless, there are significant differences across Member States, with a core–periphery divide both before
and after the crisis. Before the crisis, eastern European Member States experienced a rapid catch-up process with
fast economic growth, while growth was moderate in EU15 countries generally and even more so in some
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain) once the effect of inflation differentials are discounted. At the
same time, employment levels rose generally more in eastern European countries (although also in Spain and
Ireland), more moderately in Continental and Scandinavian countries and even more so in some Mediterranean
countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece), the UK and France. Unemployment rates were notably reduced in all eastern
European countries (except Hungary), while they increased in Anglo-Saxon countries and Portugal.24
The Great Recession shifted the sign of the core–periphery divide. Economic activity was negatively affected
across all countries but especially in the European periphery, represented in this case by eastern European and
Mediterranean countries. Some countries in the eastern European group recovered rapidly and managed to
continue their catch-up process, while the economies of Mediterranean countries remained under considerable
strain. As a result of these trends, employment levels declined significantly in Mediterranean countries (and
Ireland and Denmark) and in some eastern European countries (mainly the Baltic states), but not in those that
were less affected or recovered more quickly (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). On the other
hand, the European core countries (represented in this case by Continental and Scandinavian countries and the
UK) have been much more resilient in the crisis. GDP per capita levels did not register large corrections between
2008 and 2014 and employment continued to expand after 2009 in some Continental countries and the UK.
Box 3: European labour markets amid the Great Recession –
the core–periphery divide
32
Before moving to a discussion of the evolution of
inequalities across different sources of income, it is
useful to provide an overall map of European income
inequalities that will help to structure and interpret the
results presented in the following pages. Figure 13
introduces a panoramic view of inequalities across
Member States for income variables in 2014 (income
data referring to 2013). 
Inequality levels vary widely across countries, but the
different sources of income are similarly related
everywhere: inequality is lower for monthly earnings
among workers and widens notably when unemployed
and especially inactive people are added, to be reduced
again when income is pooled at the household level and
especially when it is redistributed by the state.25
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Figure 12: Employment levels, GDP per capita (indexes) and unemployment rates (%) over time     
Note: Countries are ranked by the magnitude of the employment correction between 2008 and 2014. 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS) and AMECO for GDP data.
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25 Table A2 in the annex shows data on inequality levels for all sources of income in 2014. It should be noted that inequality levels in the first measure of the
framework, full-time equivalent wages, and in the last one, household disposable income, are remarkably similar. 
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The positioning of countries in Figure 13 reflects the fact
that distribution of income inequality is the result of
economic and labour market dynamics, family
structures, labour market institutions and other public
policies that are typically associated with different
groups of countries. Although it is beyond the objectives
of this report to systematically discuss the political
economy of income inequalities in Europe, a regional–
institutional classification of countries can be useful to
describe European patterns of income inequality, as
indicated in the table (note that country clusters are
roughly listed in decreasing extent of inequality). 
Mediterranean countries are generally characterised by
high levels of inequality in household disposable
income. Inequalities in labour earnings are also
relatively high, particularly if the analysis includes the
unemployed and the inactive population. The role of
family pooling in reducing inequalities is generally
around or above the European average, but the welfare
state plays a comparatively modest role in
redistributing income. 
The Baltic states also have high levels of inequality in
household disposable income. They are found at the
upper positions of wage inequality, but contrary to what
occurs in Mediterranean countries, they are
comparatively less unequal when the effect of
unemployment and inactivity is taken into account. The
family pooling of resources has an average effect in
reducing inequality and state redistribution is
particularly weak.
Anglo-Saxon countries have intermediate to high levels
of income inequality. They have the highest levels of
inequality for the wages of employees, but their relative
position in Europe becomes less salient once
unemployment and inactivity are considered as well
(although in Ireland a high inactivity rate pushes up its
position in terms of market income inequalities for the
working age population). The effect of family pooling of
resources is weak, while that of the welfare state is
about average in the UK and quite strong in Ireland,
which results in the latter moving down positions in the
final inequality ranking.
Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
Figure 13: Gini indices for different income categories, 2014      
Note: Countries are ranked by the magnitude of the household disposable income inequality. 
Source: EU-SILC.
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Mediterranean countries Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal
and Spain
Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
Anglo-Saxon countries Ireland and the UK 
Central and eastern European
(CEE) countries 
Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
Continental countries Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg and
Netherlands
Scandinavian countries Denmark, Finland and Sweden
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Central and eastern European (CEE) countries are split
between intermediate (Poland and Hungary) and low
levels of household disposable income inequality
(Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). They have
relatively low inequality levels among the workforce,
but they generally move up the inequality ranking once
unemployed and inactive people are included in the
analysis. The family pooling of resources generally plays
a strong role in reducing inequalities, while the state
has a relatively important role in Slovenia, Hungary and
the Czech Republic.
Continental countries are a diverse group characterised
by intermediate to relatively low inequalities. They
generally occupy an intermediate position in terms of
wage inequality and then they generally move down in
the inequality ranking when the sample is extended to
unemployed people. The role of the family pooling of
resources in reducing inequalities is around average
when compared to the rest of the Member States, while
that of the welfare state redistribution is relatively
important generally. 
Scandinavian countries have low levels of household
disposable income inequality. They register low
inequality levels among the workforce and they are the
most egalitarian countries once the sample extends to
all the working age population. The moderation of
inequalities by the family pooling of resources is the
weakest across all clusters, but their welfare states are
among the most redistributive in Europe.
Labour earnings among the
working, active and whole
population 
Figure 14 introduces data on inequality levels for
unadjusted personal labour earnings considered among
three different populations: workers, the active
population and the whole working age population.
Inequalities in monthly earnings among workers are
logically more subdued, although they still vary notably
across countries, being relatively high in Anglo-Saxon
and some Mediterranean and Baltic countries and
lowest in Scandinavian countries, some CEE countries
(except Poland) and Belgium, with cross-country
variations resulting from wage differentials and the
effect of self-employment and part-time work (see Box 4
for details). As expected, labour income inequalities
widen notably once the analysis includes active and
inactive people who do not earn labour income, with
cross-country differentials mainly depending on the
number of unemployed and inactive people.
The most revealing picture emerges when comparing
the trends across these different indicators, which
shows that growing income inequality from the onset of
the crisis is mainly due to rising unemployment levels
and not widening pay differentials among workers.
Income inequalities among the active population and
the whole working age population increase across most
countries from 2009 (income data referring to 2008).26
Conversely, the evolution of earnings inequality among
workers is moderate and more mixed.27 In fact, Figure
14 shows how in the countries where unemployment
grew more, the crisis often had a contradictory impact
on the earnings of workers and the labour income of the
working age population: while it made the latter
significantly more unequal (by expanding the share of
people earning no labour income), it often reduced the
inequality of the former (probably a compositional
effect, since those leaving employment in a crisis tend
to have lower wages).
Figure 14 also reflects the strong divide that emerges
between the European core and the periphery from the
crisis. Unemployment hikes and the associated surges
in income inequalities are much more significant in the
Mediterranean and Baltic countries (and Ireland,
Slovakia and Slovenia) than in Continental and
Scandinavian countries (with perhaps the exception of
Austria and Denmark, which register growing
inequalities among workers and the active population).
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
26 The effect of the crisis is stronger on labour income among the active population because unemployment grew significantly and thus so did the share of
unemployed workers with no labour income. For the full working age population, this impact is partly diluted by the large and more stable share of inactive
population. 
27 The notable surge in Spain in 2009 may at least partially be a methodological artefact because it only emerged in a recent revision of EU-SILC data in that
country.
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Even if the crisis hit countries to very different degrees,
unemployment turbulence generally is the key channel
through which income inequalities were pushed
upwards and outside labour markets; this centrality of
unemployment explains the business cycle behaviour of
income inequalities. While wage inequality fails to show
a clear cyclical pattern, inequalities among the active
population and the whole population move counter-
cyclically across most countries, growing from the onset
of the crisis (falling only where unemployment did not
significantly grow – in Poland, the UK and the
Continental countries of Germany , Belgium and
Luxembourg).
Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
Figure 14: Gini indices for labour income across different population groups      
Source: EU-SILC and LFS (unemployment rate).
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It could be argued that the effect of the crisis on labour
earnings inequalities among the active population has
been overestimated in this analysis because an income
of zero does not correctly represent the situation of
many unemployed people, who may receive
unemployment benefits to compensate them for their
lost labour income. It has been argued that
unemployment benefits should be taken into account
for providing a lower bound estimate of labour income
inequality levels (OECD, 2011). This is done in Box 5,
showing that levels of inequality among the active
population do decline but only slightly when
considering the effect of the unemployment benefits.
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Inequalities in unadjusted monthly earnings are the result of differentials in wages but also part-time and self-
employment rates, as illustrated by the three measures of labour earnings presented in Figure 15. Differentials in
full-time equivalent wages among employees are significant and vary from the highest in Portugal, the Baltic
states and Anglo-Saxon countries to the lowest in Belgium, Slovakia and the Scandinavian countries (see
Eurofound, 2015 for more details), but they are lower than inequalities in labour earnings among workers. 
Inequalities grow notably once income from self-employment is considered, since it is more unevenly distributed
than wages among employees. This occurs in all countries, but especially in countries with more self-
employment, such as Greece and Italy. Inequalities expand further when monthly earnings are not adjusted by
part-time work, although less strongly except in some countries where part-time employment is particularly high,
such as the Netherlands, Germany and the UK.
Despite differences in levels, labour earnings inequalities generally show the same evolution across the three
indicators. As opposed to the counter-cyclical pattern in annual labour earnings due to the effect of
unemployment, none of the three indicators of labour earnings among the workforce reflect a clear business
cyclicality, with country patterns being very mixed from the onset of the crisis (before the crisis, inequalities in
earnings among the workforce expanded in around two-thirds of the countries between 2005 and 2008).
Box 4: Different sources of labour earnings inequalities among workers 
Figure 15: Gini indices for different measures of monthly labour income     
Source: EU-SILC and LFS (unemployment rate).
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Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
People who lose their job often receive compensatory income from the state, so not taking this into account may
produce unrealistically high estimates of inequality in labour earnings among the active population. The extent to
which inequality can be reduced by unemployment benefits will in principle depend on the unemployment rate
and the coverage and generosity of unemployment benefits. However, the quality of the data available to
estimate this effect may have a significant influence in practice. 
Figure 16 presents data for those countries where unemployment benefits are more relevant in reducing labour
earnings inequalities (according to EU-SILC data). The addition of unemployment benefits to the income of the
active population results in a significant drop in the estimated levels of inequality in many Scandinavian and
Continental countries, probably reflecting the relative strength of this scheme in these countries. As expected,
labour income inequality level estimates would be lower as well in those countries more affected by the crisis and
registering growing employment levels, such as in the Mediterranean countries and Ireland. 
A detailed analysis of the role of welfare state taxes and transfers in cushioning market inequalities in the crisis
will be conducted later in this chapter. 
Box 5: Assessing the impact of unemployment benefits
on labour income inequalities
Figure 16: Gini indices for annual labour income among active people     
Source: EU-SILC and LFS (unemployment rate).
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Role of the family in reducing
income inequalities
The inequalities in annual labour earnings among
working age individuals presented in the previous
section are to some extent an artificial indicator since
most individuals pool their income at the household
level. This section analyses the extent to which the
family pooling of resources manages to reduce income
inequalities due to economies of scale and to some
members of the household compensating for the lack of
labour income of others. It shows that a certain
deterioration in this capacity seemed to occur across
many countries, which may be related to increases in
the number of households with no labour income as the
crisis went on, as well as to a decrease in the size of
households. Since the main objective of this section is
to map the effect of the family pooling of resources, it
will focus only on annual labour income. An analysis of
capital income is provided separately in Box 6. 
Figure 17 shows that for the EU as a whole, the pooling
of personal annual labour earnings at the household
level reduces inequality in that indicator by around 22%
(on average during the period 2005–2014, income
referring to 2004–2013). Cross-country variations are
notable, with this effect being relatively larger in most
CEE and Mediterranean countries and more modest in
Scandinavian countries and as well in Anglo-Saxon and
Baltic countries.
The yearly evolution of inequalities in household-
pooled annual labour earnings is not shown here
because it closely follows the evolution of inequalities in
personal labour earnings among the working age
population presented earlier. This would suggest that
no relevant changes in the role played by families in
cushioning income inequalities have occurred, which
would be consistent with the fact that the demographic
developments that would have an effect on such a role
are not likely to change significantly in the short time
span covered here. Nevertheless, Figure 17 shows that
the redistributive effect of the household (measured by
the reduction in the Gini of earnings when they are
pooled and distributed among members of households)
is slightly smaller at the end of the period than at the
beginning across most countries, especially in
Mediterranean countries and Ireland. Conversely, this
effect strengthens in a few eastern European
countries(mainly Poland, and Hungary, Lithuania and
Latvia). 
Two reasons seem to be behind these developments.
The most relevant is probably the proportion of people
living in households with no labour income, which
generally fell before the crisis and then increased
thereafter (see Figure 18). This increase was notable as
the crisis progressed in Mediterranean countries and
Ireland, which would explain the diminished average
capacity of households to redistribute personal labour
incomes in these countries.
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Figure 17: Reduction in inequality when moving from annual labour earnings among individuals to
family-pooled annual labour earnings (%)      
Note: Countries have been ranked by the average reduction of inequality over the period 2005–2014
Source: EU-SILC.
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Secondly, the evolution of the capacity of families to
cushion income inequalities may also be influenced by
changes in the average size of households across
countries, since the latter captures demographic
changes such as the increase in the number of
households with a single member or with a single
parent, which would reduce the economies of scale at
the household level (see Figure 19). Even in the short
period covered, it can be seen that the average
household size is declining across most Member States. 
Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
Figure 18: Proportion of people living in households with no labour income (%)      
Note: Countries are ranked by the relative increase in this proportion between 2005 and 2014. 
Source: EU-SILC.
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Figure 19: Average household size across countries      
Source: EU-SILC.
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Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
The analysis in this section has considered only the effect of the family pooling of annual labour income.
Nevertheless, this report typically focuses on the measure of household market income, which considers the
pooling of labour and capital income at the household level jointly. The reason for not studying capital flows
separately is that in practical terms it has almost no effect on results, probably because of the very limited quality
of the information provided by the EU-SILC in this respect.
Box 6: Distribution of capital flows and their effect on income inequalities 
Figure 20: Distribution of capital and labour income over the quintiles of family-pooled annual labour
earnings (average for the period 2007–2014)     
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Redistributive effect of the
welfare state 
While the previous section looked at the redistributive
role of families, this one will look at the extent to which
the welfare state is able to correct inequalities in market
income through taxes and benefits that redistribute
income across individuals and households. It shows
that the capacity of the welfare state to cushion income
inequalities is greater than that of families across most
Member States and that public schemes have
significantly offset growing market income inequalities
in the European periphery during the crisis, although
this capacity may be eroding in some countries in the
most recent years. 
Table 3 shows that European welfare states reduce
market income inequality by almost 30% for the EU as a
whole. Again, there are notable country differentials,
with welfare states playing an even bigger role in
Scandinavian and some CEE, Continental countries and
Ireland, while their effect is relatively weaker in Baltic
and Mediterranean countries, where in fact it is
comparable to the effect of the family pooling of
resources.28
Importantly, the capacity to correct market income
inequalities varies strongly across the different welfare
policies.
£ Taxes on income and social contributions are
generally the most redistributive welfare policy and
have a relatively larger effect in reducing income
inequalities in Anglo-Saxon, Continental and
Scandinavian countries (although largest in
Slovenia), while the impact is by and large less
relevant in several eastern European countries.29
£ Pensions are almost as redistributive as income
taxes and are the most important of the social
benefits in reducing income inequalities across all
countries, especially in the CEE countries, the Baltic
states, the Mediterranean countries and France. 
£ Unemployment benefits are most relevant in
Continental and Scandinavian countries and in
some of the countries hit hardest by the crisis, such
as Ireland, Spain and Portugal. 
£ Disability benefits are significant across most
countries, often having a more redistributive
impact than unemployment benefits. 
£ Family benefits have a stronger impact in reducing
inequalities in Continental, Anglo-Saxon, CEE
countries but less so in Mediterranean countries
generally. 
£ The rest of the welfare state schemes have a more
modest impact generally, although housing policy is
relatively more important in several Scandinavian,
Anglo-Saxon, Continental countries, survivor’s
benefits in Mediterranean countries and sickness
and education benefits in Scandinavian countries.
Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
The capital and private transfer variables of the EU-SILC refer to income flows originating from investments
(income from rents, interest, dividends and similar) and private transfers (income received by young people
below 16 years of age living in the household and the difference between the inter-household cash transfers
received and those paid). Figure 20 shows how these two sources of income are distributed across income
quintiles and provides some clues to help explain the limited role played by capital in this analysis based on EU-
SILC data.
First, the EU-SILC’s ability to capture capital flows adequately seems questionable, which probably results in an
underestimation among European households. Second, the figure shows that according to the EU-SILC, capital
income is in fact more spread than labour income among the working age population, which explains why the
inclusion of capital in the analysis of this report often results in (negligible) reductions in income inequality,
contrary to what would be expected according to the literature. Almost half of the total labour income mass is
owned by the top quintile across most countries, while the bottom quintile accounts for very little of it, due to the
impact of unemployment. Conversely, capital income as measured by the EU-SILC is found across all quintiles,
even if unevenly.
The figure also reveals the very different nature of capital income and private transfers. Capital income is more
unevenly distributed and its largest part goes to the top quintile, while private transfers are much more evident at
the bottom than at the top income quintiles, reflecting solidarity mechanisms between households, probably
involving family members. In other words, private transfers may be seen as part of the family pooling of
resources. In any case, the effect of capital income and private transfers on the results is negligible, so it can be
simply ignored. With the EU-SILC, it is probably impossible to evaluate adequately the effect of this source of
income on inequality.
28 In Cyprus, the family plays a larger role than the welfare state in reducing market income inequalities.
29 Conversely, taxes on wealth have a negligible effect (EU-SILC data would suggest that they often add to inequality, although to an extremely low extent),
which is one reason why their individual impact is not shown here.
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The Great Recession, the ensuing sovereign debt crisis
and the resulting pressures on public finances are
putting welfare states across Europe under
considerable strain. Their resilience can be assessed by
looking at the evolution of their effect in reducing
market inequalities across countries. Figure 21 provides
a mixed picture across countries, but in general it shows
that European welfare states continue to perform an
essential role in reducing market inequalities. 
The strength of the state’s redistributive role remains
rather stable in around half of the countries, reflected
by a parallel evolution in market and household
disposable income inequalities. In the other half, some
changes in this role may have occurred during the
period. The redistributive effect of the state expanded in
the crisis in many of the countries registering notable
surges in unemployment, thus significantly cushioning
the big expansion of market income inequalities over
the period. A widening gap between market and
household disposable income inequalities has emerged
over several years, mainly in the European periphery: in
many Mediterranean (except for Cyprus) and Anglo-
Saxon countries and the Baltic states to a lower
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Table 3: Relative reduction in inequality when moving from household market income to
household disposable income (%)       
All Taxes Benefits
Welfare Income tax Pensions Unemployment Disability Family Housing Survivor’s Sickness Education Other
SI -41.7 -18.7 -14.3 -1.5 -5.9 -3.2 -0.1 -1.7 -0.8 -1.1 -1.9
HU -41.2 -13.4 -17.2 -2.5 -6.6 -5.9 -0.4 -0.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6
IE -41.0 -17.1 -4.2 -9.4 -6.7 -8.7 -1.6 -0.7 0.0 -0.7 -0.2
BE -38.7 -14.5 -8.9 -9.2 -4.3 -3.4 0.0 -1.2 -1.3 -0.3 -1.1
FI -38.4 -13.8 -7.2 -7.1 -7.2 -2.9 -2.4 -0.5 -0.9 -1.3 -1.4
DK -37.4 -11.5 -3.0 -10.6 -9.1 -1.4 -1.0 -0.3 -2.0 -3.9 0.0
AT -36.6 -14.3 -12.8 -3.8 -4.1 -4.1 -0.4 -1.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.6
NL -36.4 -14.7 -9.4 -2.4 -5.4 -1.4 -1.2 -0.6 -0.7 -1.6 -4.8
CZ -36.2 -11.5 -15.7 -0.8 -6.6 -3.0 -0.5 -1.2 -0.9 -0.1 -0.8
LU -34.4 -11.3 -11.2 -3.3 -3.8 -4.8 -0.3 -1.9 -0.3 -0.3 -2.1
SE -34.1 -12.7 -5.3 -3.4 -6.4 -3.4 -1.1 -0.3 -2.3 -3.7 -1.2
DE -32.7 -11.5 -9.8 -4.4 -2.8 -3.3 -1.6 -1.3 -0.4 -0.6 -1.2
FR -32.6 -7.5 -14.8 -4.3 -1.6 -3.0 -2.8 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.5
SK -32.5 -6.2 -16.9 -0.8 -5.2 -2.9 0.0 -2.1 -0.4 -0.2 -1.7
UK -31.1 -14.7 -7.1 -0.9 -2.4 -4.0 -3.4 -0.3 -1.2 -0.6 -2.3
EU -28.6 -10.1 -9.8 -3.2 -2.9 -2.2 -1.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.5 -1.2
PL -28.6 -4.3 -16.4 -1.3 -5.1 -2.0 -0.3 -1.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4
EL -28.2 -9.7 -15.3 -1.3 -1.9 -0.7 -0.1 -1.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.5
PT -27.6 -11.5 -9.0 -3.5 -2.6 -1.2 -0.1 -1.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.8
IT -26.7 -10.2 -12.8 -2.0 -2.4 -1.1 -0.1 -1.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
ES -25.9 -8.3 -8.0 -5.8 -3.5 -0.3 -0.1 -2.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5
LT -23.7 -5.7 -8.7 -1.0 -5.7 -1.9 -0.1 -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 -2.0
EE -23.1 -6.3 -9.6 -1.0 -4.9 -2.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
LV -20.9 -6.4 -9.3 -1.1 -2.7 -1.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 -0.5
CY -17.8 -5.6 -4.3 0.4 -3.7 -3.3 -0.2 -1.3 -0.3 -1.0 -0.4
Note: The figures show the average reduction over the period 2007–2014 (income referring to 2006–2013), in total and by individual welfare state
policies. Countries have been ranked by the magnitude of the total reduction. However, the sum of the individual effects of each policy does not
equal the total effect of the welfare state: on the one hand, because the total effect takes into account the interplay across all welfare policies and
on the other hand because the individual effect of taxes and benefits are calculated differently. The effect of benefits is calculated by comparing
inequalities in market income with inequalities in the market income incorporating each specific public transfer, while the effect of taxes does not
use as a reference the market income but the total household income (including income coming from public transfers). Data need to be interpreted
with caution since some of these items have a significant number of missing values.
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extent.30 Nevertheless, the redistributive impact of the
welfare state seems to have weakened in Germany,
Sweden, France, Poland or Hungary, though this may
simply reflect less need of state redistribution in the
context of a much milder effect of the economic crisis.
Patterns of inequality in
household disposable income 
Household disposable income is the final measure of
the income actually available to the working age
population. It is the measure most commonly used by
inequality studies and it merits a final, more detailed
look. Table 4 shows developments in household
disposable income inequalities across Member States
between 2005 and 2014 (income referring to
2004–2013).
Income inequalities have expanded in two-thirds of the
countries over the period: most notably in some
Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Spain and Greece, but
only moderately in Italy) and some Scandinavian
countries (Denmark and Sweden). Inequalities have
expanded moderately in Continental countries (with the
exception of Belgium), some eastern European
countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Slovakia) and
Ireland. Conversely, inequalities narrowed in one-third
of the countries, significantly in Belgium, Portugal, the
UK and especially Poland, but also in some other
countries in the eastern part of Europe (Lithuania,
Latvia, the Czech Republic) and Finland.31 These trends
across countries have resulted in a process of
convergence in the levels of income inequality across
Member States, discussed in detail in Box 7.
Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
Figure 21: Gini indices for household market income and household disposable income      
Source: EU-SILC and LFS (unemployment rate).
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30 A strengthening of the inequality-reducing impact of the welfare state seems to occur as well in other countries, where inequalities in household disposable
income remained quite stagnant (Belgium, Finland, Czech Republic) or declined (Netherlands, Luxembourg, Lithuania) between 2009 and 2014 against the
general background of a moderate growth in market income inequalities.
31 The increase in inequalities across most countries between 2005 and 2014 does not contradict the reduction registered in EU-wide inequality levels over the
same period, since the former mainly resulted from developments in income levels between countries rather than inequality developments within countries
(see Chapter 3).
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As has been argued in previous pages, the upward trend
in income inequalities across most Member States over
the period is the result of the Great Recession and the
resulting employment turbulence (countries have been
ranked in Table 4 by the magnitude of the income
inequality increase they registered between 2009 and
2014). This is reflected in a counter-cyclical
development that exacerbated the core–periphery
divide in Europe.
Country patterns were mixed between 2005 and 2009
(income referring to 2004–2008): While patterns are
mixed, there are more cases of reductions in income
inequalities and their relative magnitude is larger. Most
of the reductions are concentrated in the European
periphery – eastern European countries and most
Mediterranean countries (except Cyprus and Greece,
where inequalities expanded only marginally), together
with the Anglo-Saxon countries and Belgium.
Conversely, inequalities expanded in the European core,
particularly in the Continental countries (with the
exception of Belgium) and the Scandinavian countries
(except for Finland). EU-wide income inequality
declined notably over this subperiod, but largely due to
a process of convergence in income levels between
Member States (see Figure 5).
Income inequalities expanded in two-thirds of the
countries between 2009 and 2014 (income referring to
2009–2013): Most likely, this was as a result of growing
unemployment. This is why the surges in inequality
occured among most countries in the European
periphery, where most of the employment losses took
place: Mediterranean countries (except for Portugal)
Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Table 4: Household disposable income inequality across countries (Gini indices and percentages)      
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Change
2005–2014 (%)
Change
2005–2009 (%)
Change
2009–2014(%)
CY 0.281 0.283 0.296 0.285 0.289 0.300 0.290 0.311 0.329 0.360 28.2 3.1 24.3
HU 0.286 0.336 0.267 0.258 0.251 0.246 0.275 0.275 0.286 0.298 4.2 -12.2 18.6
EE 0.339 0.329 0.334 0.301 0.307 0.311 0.321 0.325 0.324 0.353 4.1 -9.4 14.9
DK 0.232 0.235 0.246 0.249 0.242 0.250 0.267 0.271 0.270 0.272 17.2 4.0 12.7
SI 0.235 0.234 0.230 0.229 0.222 0.235 0.234 0.237 0.234 0.249 5.7 -5.7 12.1
ES 0.320 0.309 0.310 0.310 0.319 0.329 0.335 0.342 0.341 0.353 10.5 -0.1 10.6
IE 0.317 0.318 0.308 0.295 0.287 0.311 0.303 0.305 0.307 0.318 0.2 -9.4 10.6
SK 0.264 0.279 0.240 0.235 0.248 0.263 0.258 0.254 0.243 0.267 1.1 -5.9 7.4
EL 0.330 0.346 0.340 0.332 0.334 0.337 0.335 0.340 0.353 0.357 8.2 1.2 6.9
DE 0.277 0.284 0.291 0.293 0.281 0.284 0.283 0.276 0.287 0.297 7.4 1.5 5.9
IT 0.326 0.320 0.320 0.308 0.311 0.314 0.321 0.326 0.334 0.328 0.5 -4.6 5.3
SE 0.231 0.238 0.232 0.235 0.242 0.238 0.240 0.244 0.249 0.252 8.8 4.9 3.8
EU 0.355 0.344 0.343 0.337 0.330 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.334 0.336 -5.4 -7.1 1.9
CZ 0.262 0.254 0.253 0.248 0.253 0.251 0.254 0.253 0.251 0.255 -2.7 -3.4 0.7
AT 0.259 0.253 0.258 0.274 0.276 0.280 0.274 0.278 0.270 0.277 6.9 6.4 0.5
BE 0.285 0.275 0.257 0.272 0.257 0.255 0.259 0.259 0.256 0.258 -9.5 -9.8 0.4
FI 0.259 0.258 0.261 0.261 0.254 0.253 0.258 0.258 0.254 0.254 -1.8 -2.0 0.2
PT 0.376 0.372 0.366 0.356 0.352 0.333 0.339 0.340 0.344 0.348 -7.4 -6.2 -1.3
NL 0.257 0.252 0.272 0.270 0.265 0.254 0.252 0.252 0.250 0.261 1.6 3.3 -1.6
FR 0.273 0.274 0.265 0.291 0.294 0.295 0.304 0.303 0.304 0.289 5.7 7.5 -1.7
UK 0.341 0.317 0.321 0.331 0.322 0.326 0.328 0.315 0.306 0.316 -7.1 -5.4 -1.8
PL 0.379 0.340 0.330 0.326 0.322 0.318 0.316 0.314 0.313 0.314 -17.2 -15.2 -2.4
LT 0.371 0.353 0.336 0.339 0.359 0.383 0.342 0.325 0.349 0.350 -5.7 -3.3 -2.5
LV 0.367 0.388 0.352 0.364 0.368 0.363 0.355 0.362 0.354 0.353 -3.9 0.2 -4.1
LU 0.265 0.282 0.277 0.280 0.297 0.281 0.274 0.279 0.303 0.281 6.1 12.0 -5.2
Note: Countries are ranked by the magnitude of the income inequality increase between 2009 and 2014. 
Source: EU-SILC.
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and several eastern European countries (not in Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland). Rising unemployment also
seems to drive increases in inequality in Ireland and in
the Scandinavian countries (except for Finland).
Conversely, inequalities remained rather contained in
most of the European core, in Continental countries and
in Finland, either increasing or even falling moderately.
Inequalities also fell in some other countries where the
impact of the crisis on unemployment levels was less
marked (Luxembourg, Poland and the UK) or improved
after the initial years of the crisis (Latvia and Lithuania).
EU-wide income inequality increased modestly from
2009 due to these generally growing inequalities within-
countries and the interruption of the process of income
convergence between countries (see Figure 5).
The analysis highlights the important role played by
European welfare states in cushioning growing market
inequalities, an effect that has been particularly
important in the European periphery (the
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries and the
Baltics to a lower extent), where the crisis hit most
strongly. This explains why, although important, the
core–periphery divergence emerging in Europe from the
onset of the crisis is less marked for household
disposable income than for market income and why the
increases in inequality, although affecting most Member
States and significant in many cases, are probably not
as large as generally thought. The relative increase in
income inequalities did not exceed 10% between 2009
and 2014 across many countries. Exceptions to this
were three countries in the eastern part of Europe
(Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia), two Mediterranean
countries (Cyprus and Spain), and Ireland, where
inequalities expanded more.32 The action of the welfare
states significantly alleviated the impact of rising
unemployment rates in pushing income inequalities
upwards (see Box 8 on next page for further details). 
Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
Table 4 above shows that inequalities in household disposable income expanded between 2005 and 2014 among
some of the countries where they were initially lowest (the Scandinavian and Continental countries), while in the
same period they decreased in some of the countries that were most unequal (the eastern European countries of
Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, as well as Portugal and the UK). Although the magnitude of the rise in inequality among
initially egalitarian countries were generally larger, the declines in inequality among the initially most unequal
are also quite significant, which suggests a process of convergence towards intermediate income inequality levels
between European countries. Signs of a process of convergence in inequality levels have already been identified
in the literature (among OECD countries, OECD 2011).
Figure 22 shows that this process of convergence has varied over time. A modest convergence in inequality levels
took place prior to the crisis (between 2005 and 2009, income referring to 2004–2008). Income inequalities
declined among a majority of the most unequal countries, typically in the periphery (the Baltic countries as well
as Poland, Portugal and the UK), while they expanded among many of the most egalitarian countries in the
European core (the Scandinavian and Continental countries). This modest convergence in income inequality
levels continued in the initial years of the financial crisis, since inequalities continued to increase in many of the
most egalitarian countries (Denmark and Finland as well as the eastern European countries of Slovakia, Hungary,
the Czech Republic and Slovenia), while they continued to decline among some of the most unequal countries
(Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal). 
But this process ceased from 2011 (income referring to 2010) since the rather generalised increase in income
inequalities is spread among Member States, regardless of their levels of income inequality. 
Box 7: Convergence towards intermediate levels of inequality? 
32 Household disposable income inequality increased by more than 10% as well in Denmark, but market inequality also increased substantially.
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Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Figure 22: Household disposable income inequalities across countries     
Source: EU-SILC.
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This report has shown that the crisis has generally pushed income inequalities up via declining labour incomes
associated with growing unemployment levels, since income inequalities among workers did not increase
generally. 
The role of unemployment changes in driving income inequalities over time is assessed here by means of a
regression analysis that compares the strength of this association across the different sources of income covered
in this report. Unemployment rates are regressed on income inequality levels across countries and over time
(between 2005 and 2014, income referring to 2004–2013) using four different regression analyses: pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS), random effects, fixed effects and fixed effects with robust estimates (Table 5).
Focusing on the results using fixed effects with robust estimates, two main insights emerge. First, growing
unemployment pushed inequalities significantly upwards among the working age population but not among
workers, which is reflected by the significant coefficients for the variables of annual labour earnings and market
income, while those of the variables covering monthly earnings among workers are not statistically significant.
Second, the effect of unemployment in driving inequalities in household disposable income is weaker than in the
other income variables and becomes statistically insignificant for the fixed-effect model with robust estimates,
which reflects the role of the welfare state in cushioning growing market income inequalities, as has been
extensively underlined in this chapter.
Box 8: Impact of unemployment on income inequality levels  
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Summary 
This chapter has provided an updated European map of
income inequalities across different regions: the
Mediterranean, Baltic, Anglo-Saxon, CEE, Continental
and Scandinavian countries. The results document
growing income inequalities in two-thirds of Member
States over the period 2005–2014 (income referring to
2004–2013), in line with previous empirical studies from
the OECD reporting an upwards trend in inequalities in
household disposable income. Nevertheless, the
findings in this report substantially complement those
from previous studies: unemployment and its effect on
declining labour income emerges as the main driver
pushing inequalities upwards and outside the workforce
as a result of the crisis, instead of widening labour
income differentials among the workforce (which did
not seem to play a significant role from the onset of the
crisis but were identified in the mentioned OECD studies
as the main factor driving inequalities up in the decades
before the crisis). The centrality of the role of
unemployment explains why inequalities behave
generally counter-cyclically across most countries,
falling before the crisis and increasing thereafter,
especially in those countries in the European periphery
that were more heavily hit by the crisis and where
employment losses have been larger (the
Mediterranean, the Baltic states and some CEE
countries and Ireland).
There are two non-market mechanisms that reduce
income inequalities. First, the role of the family pooling
of income reduces personal labour income inequalities
by more than 20% for the EU as a whole and is
especially strong in CEE and Mediterranean countries.
Nevertheless, a relative deterioration in this role of the
family seems to have taken place during the period,
probably due to an increase in the number of
households with no labour income to distribute from
the onset of the crisis and perhaps also marginally to a
small reduction in the average household size across
most Member States. 
Second, European welfare states play a more significant
redistributive role than families and reduce household
market inequalities by almost 30% for the EU as a whole
and by much more in Scandinavian and some CEE and
Continental countries (and Ireland), with income taxes
and pension benefits being by far the most relevant
schemes, followed by income taxes, unemployment,
disability and family benefits. The role of the state
remained more or less unchanged during the period in
half of the countries, although it seems to have
weakened in some cases (Germany, Sweden, France,
Poland and Hungary), perhaps because the welfare
states of these countries had not been put to a serious
test since their economies generally weathered the
crisis better. The most significant development took
place in some of the countries in the European
periphery hardest hit by the crisis , where the
redistributive effect of the state on market income
inequalities became more important over the period.
Comparative analysis of inequality trends within Member States
Table 5: Results of the regression analysis      
Pooled OLS Random effects Fixed effects
Fixed effects – robust
estimates
Variable Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t
Monthly wage (full-time
equivalent)
0.001173 0.049 0.000268 0.343 0.000246 0.389 0.000246 0.722
Monthly earnings (full-time
equivalent)
0.001346 0.015 0.000657 0.039 0.000630 0.052 0.000630 0.349
Monthly earnings 0.001342 0.025 0.000994 0.002 0.000983 0.002 0.000983 0.124
Annual labour earnings
(active)
0.005876 0.0 0.005294 0.0 0.005267 0.0 0.005267 0.0
Annual labour earnings (all) 0.004980 0.0 0.003420 0.0 0.003385 0.0 0.003385 0.0
Market income 0.003708 0.0 0.003897 0.0 0.003905 0.0 0.003905 0.0
Household disposable
income
0.004018 0.0 0.001148 0.0 0.001054 0.0 0.001054 0.055
Note: Coefficients in green reflect statistical significance at the 1% level, in blue at the 5% level and in red not statistically significant at
the 5% level.
Source: EU-SILC.

The information provided by relative measures of
inequality in previous sections is complemented here by
mapping developments in income levels across the
distribution. All the figures of change in income levels in
this section are expressed in national currencies and
adjusted by inflation in order to reflect more directly the
impact of the crisis across European societies.33
Mapping income levels at different parts of the
distribution provides a more direct picture of inequality
trends and reveals effects on the whole distribution that
can be concealed when the analysis is focused on
relative inequality measures, as in the previous pages.
Figure 23 plots how real income changed over the
period by income deciles (that is, each point in the
horizontal axis represents 10% of the working age
population, sorted from left to right from lower to
higher household disposable income). Before the crisis
(between 2005 and 2009, income referring to 2004–
2008), income levels progressed particularly fast in the
eastern European periphery (and to a lesser extent in
Anglo-Saxon countries). This progress often benefited
those at the bottom of the distribution more, explaining
the reductions in income inequality in these countries.
Conversely, real income levels remained much more
stable in many Mediterranean, Continental and
Scandinavian countries. In most Continental and
Scandinavian countries, real income remained stagnant
or negative at the bottom of the distribution (especially
in Germany and Austria), which explains the increases in
income inequality in these countries. In the case of most
Mediterranean countries, real income remained rather
stagnant but trends over the income distribution vary
across countries (with inequalities declining in Portugal
and Italy).34
6 Impact of the Great Recession on
income levels
33 Income levels are expressed in euros for members of the euro zone (including those countries that joined  during the period covered here: Cyprus, Estonia,
Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia) and in national currencies for the others. All income levels are then adjusted for national inflation  to obtain real income levels
across countries.
34 The larger growth in real income levels in Spain is largely due to a considerable expansion in 2009, which in turn is largely due to a data revision in EU-SILC’s
income variables in the 2009 wave.
Figure 23: Average yearly growth of household real disposable income, by income deciles (%)      
Note: Data refers to average yearly growth rates during each of the three sub-periods (income data referring to one year earlier than the one indicated)
Source: EU-SILC.
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Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and after the Great Recession
Figure 24: Real household disposable income levels across three income classes (indices)      
Source: EU-SILC and LFS (unemployment rate).
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Figure 25: Real household disposable and market income levels across two income classes (indices)      
Source: EU-SILC.
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Figure 23 shows that the crisis had a significant negative
effect on real income levels across Member States , a
finding that contrasts markedly with the relatively mild
developments in inequality indices across many
countries discussed in previous pages. The impact is
generally stronger in the European periphery (in
Mediterranean and CEE countries protractedly and in
the Baltic states and Anglo-Saxon countries during the
initial stage of the financial crisis) and typically stronger
at the bottom of the distribution, which explains the
hikes in income inequality across many of these
countries from the onset of the crisis. The magnitude of
the real income decline was generally more modest in
Continental and Scandinavian countries, although in
most cases it remained skewed towards the lower
income deciles, thus contributing to growing
inequalities. 
A more synthetic picture of trends over the income
distribution is provided by using the three income
classes proposed by Piketty (2014), distinguishing
between the 50% of the population with the lowest level
of household disposable income, the next 40% and the
top 10% of the population with the highest incomes (see
Figure 24). The data broadly confirm the previous
picture. Before the crisis, income levels expanded
notably in eastern European countries across all income
groups and typically more among the lowest income
group. In the rest of Europe, income levels grew more
moderately, with the following specificities: first, there
was relatively more progress at the bottom half of the
distribution in Anglo-Saxon countries (and in Spain and
Finland to a lesser extent); and second, there was
stagnation in real income levels in the rest of countries
except for those at the very top, which progressed more
in Continental countries (and Denmark) and were
corrected downwards in Italy and Portugal or Belgium. 
Again, the large negative impact of the crisis is clear,
especially in the European periphery: a significant and
protracted correction in real income levels occurs in
most Mediterranean countries, but also to a lesser
extent in Anglo-Saxon and some CEE countries (except
Poland and Slovakia), while real income levels in Baltic
countries were strongly affected initially but then
bounced back. Nevertheless, while those at the top of
the distribution tended to suffer larger corrections in
Anglo-Saxon and eastern European countries, this was
not generally the case in Mediterranean countries. The
action of European welfare states considerably
moderated the decline of real income levels resulting
from the crisis, as reflected in Figure 25. A more intense
correction took place in market income levels, as
illustrated by countries more affected by the crisis, such
as the Mediterranean countries.
Squeezing the European middle
classes
An alternative way to assess the impact of the Great
Recession on income levels in Europe is to define
classes on the basis of common predefined income
levels. By studying the changing share of the working
age population that falls into each of those classes, the
impact of the crisis on the social structure can be
evaluated. This approach is particularly appealing
because it allows us to assess the extent to which the
crisis had a particularly strong impact on the middle
class in Europe, a subject that has received considerable
attention in the public debate. This section evaluates
whether the Great Recession has shrunk the size of the
European middle classes.
This study defines the middle class as people whose
household disposable income is between 75% and
200% of the median disposable income in each country
(respectively, three-quarters and twice the median
disposable income). Those below 75% would belong to
the lower income classes, while those above 200% of
the national median income would be the upper income
classes. Previous studies use similar but not always
identical intervals. For instance, a recent study from the
ILO defines the middle class using the range 60% to
200% of the median instead (Vaughan-Whitehead et al,
2016), but it was sought to avoid setting the lower
bound of the middle class at the level of 60% (generally
used as the poverty line), preferring to allow a 15%
buffer between the poverty line and the lower endpoint
of the middle class (Horrigan and Haugen, 1988;
Ravallion, 2010; a similar approach is used, among
others, by Atkinson and Brandolini, 2011).35
Figure 26 presents data on the size of the three income
classes over time. The size of the European middle
classes ranges from around 70% to above 50% of the
population across countries in 2014. It is larger in
Scandinavian countries, some CEE countries (the Czech
Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia) and to a lesser extent
in Continental countries, while it is smaller in
Mediterranean and Baltic countries. 
The gaps between countries in the size of the middle
class translate into significant cross-country differences
as well as in the relative sizes of the lower income class
and especially the upper income class. The lower
income class represents around 30% of the population
or more in Mediterranean, Baltic and Anglo-Saxon
countries, while it represents around 25% or less in the
Scandinavian countries, some CEE countries (the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) and some Continental
countries (the Netherlands and Austria). Relative cross-
Impact of the Great Recession on income levels
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not have significant implications for the presented results in terms of trends and general interpretation. 
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country differences are larger in the case of the upper
income class: the size of this class is only 5% or less in
the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Slovenia and
Slovakia; it is between 5% and 10% in the rest of the
Continental and CEE countries and in the Anglo-Saxon
countries; and it reaches levels above 10% in the
Mediterranean countries (apart from Italy) and the
Baltic states.
But the main interest lies in the evolution of the share of
population that falls into this income-based definition
of the middle class. Prior to the crisis (between 2005 and
2009, income referring to 2004–2008), the middle class
was expanding in around two-thirds of Member States
(especially in the countries on the European periphery)
and declining in some Continental and Scandinavian
countries (in Germany and Sweden, linked to a
significant expansion of the lower income class).
But this development was clearly reversed in the crisis.
The Great Recession has resulted in the reduction in the
size of the middle class between 2009 and 2014 (income
referring to 2008-2013) in all Member States apart from
Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland and Lithuania. This has
been especially relevant in some of the peripheral
Member States hardest hit by the crisis – several
Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece and Spain
especially) and some countries in the eastern part of the
EU (Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia) . Nevertheless,
significant reductions in the middle class have also been
registered in some countries where its size was
relatively large initially, such as the Scandinavian
countries. 
In contrast, the reduction in the size of the middle class
has typically been more modest in Anglo-Saxon and
Continental countries, which have been more protected
from the effects of the crisis. Nevertheless, it is relevant
to note that middle classes shrank both before the crisis
(in 2005–2009) and after (2009–2014) in some of the
Continental countries (Austria and Germany) as well as
in Sweden.
A more nuanced picture of this squeezing of the middle
class is provided by looking at the trends affecting the
lower and the upper income classes as well. As shown in
Figure 27, the reduction in the size of the middle classes
has resulted mainly in a larger expansion of the lower
income class than that of the upper income class, even
though the latter has increased significantly as well in
some countries (and more than the lower income class
in Ireland and Czech Republic). 
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Figure 26: Evolution in the proportion of population belonging to different income classes (%)      
Source: EU-SILC.
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Summary
This chapter has discussed the strong negative impact
of the crisis on income levels across all countries, which
is much more substantial than the moderate trends in
income inequality discussed in previous sections.
Income progressed relatively more in eastern European
countries before the crisis and especially at the bottom
of the distribution, while real income levels remained
much more stable in most Mediterranean, Continental
and Scandinavian countries (and typically with income
levels at the bottom of the distribution doing worse in
most Continental and Scandinavian countries). The
crisis had a negative impact on real income levels
everywhere (either pushing them downwards or
reducing their growth rate) – most notably in the
European periphery (in the Mediterranean countries
and some CEE countries in a protracted way, and in
Baltic and Anglo-Saxon countries during the initial stage
of the financial crisis) and especially at the bottom of
the distribution, while the income correction was
generally modest among Continental and Scandinavian
countries.
The Great Recession squeezed European middle
classes. In the final years of the previous economic
expansion, this analysis suggests that the middle
income class was in fact expanding in around two-thirds
of the countries. But this process was completely
reversed from 2009 (income referring to 2008), with
significant declines in the size of the middle class in
some countries in the European periphery and in the
Scandinavian countries . Middle classes declined
throughout the whole period from 2005 to 2014 in some
core Member States (Austria, Germany and Sweden). 
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Figure 27: Change in size of middle-income class, 2008–2014, and decomposition of change by income class
of destination (percentage points)      
Note: Countries are ranked by the absolute magnitude (in percentage points) of the decline of the middle class from 2009 to 2014
(income referring to 2008–2013). 
Source: EU-SILC.
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This report addresses growing concerns regarding
income inequality, in academic and policy debates, by
providing a detailed account of developments in Europe
over the period 2005–2014 (income referring to 2004–
2013), with two main aims: to provide an EU perspective
and to update the picture provided by previous similar
international comparisons covering the effects of the
Great Recession.
An EU-wide perspective on the analysis of income
inequalities seems particularly important in the context
of the period after the crisis. Before 2008, the EU made
some big leaps forward in terms of economic
integration (in particular, the adoption of the euro and
the enlargement to the east) that seemed to produce
good economic outcomes, with fast economic growth
and catch-up in many countries on the periphery. But
the financial crisis that emerged at the end of 2008
disrupted that process due to a much stronger impact
on the European periphery, which calls into question
the benefits of the process, and which risks
undermining the legitimacy of the process of European
integration itself. The analysis in the previous chapters
shows that these dynamics are clearly reflected in
income inequality trends. Before the crisis, a process
was visible of income convergence between countries,
one that pushed overall EU inequalities significantly
down between 2005 and 2009 (income referring to
2004–2008). After the crisis, real income convergence
between countries has essentially stalled due to the
larger impact of the crisis on the European periphery
(very protracted in the Mediterranean countries). Thus,
overall EU income inequality interrupted its notable
reduction prior to the crisis and has grown
modestlybetween 2009 and 2014 (income referring to
2008–2013) as a result of the expansion of inequality
within most countries and the disappearance of the
process of economic convergence identified in the
previous period.
The process of income convergence before the crisis
was mainly driven by a catch-up process in eastern
European countries and the stagnation of several
Continental countries and the UK. The end of
convergence after the emergence of the crisis is
associated with a significant decline in relative income
levels in the European periphery in the initial years (in
several eastern European and Mediterranean Member
States), while core Member States were generally more
resilient. Most recently, paths begin to diverge even
within the group at the periphery, with some eastern
European countries and Ireland recovering very quickly,
whereas Mediterranean Member States continued to
suffer painful corrections in their relative income levels.
This report has also offered an updated picture of
income inequality trends within Member States in the
aftermath of the recession. Inequalities in household
disposable income grew in two-thirds of Member States
between 2005 and 2014 (income referring to 2004–
2013), which can be understood as a continuation of
previous trends as identified by different international
studies (OECD, 2008; 2011). However, the findings of this
report substantially complement those from these
previous studies; they identify unemployment and its
effect on declining labour income as the main factor
behind growing inequalities in household disposable
income in the short time span from the onset of the
crisis, rather than widening wage differentials (which
seem to have been the driving force over the longer
time span of several decades covered in those previous
studies). Whether these developments will be reversed
when the recession is finally over is an empirical
question that should be addressed when this analysis is
updated in the future.
The importance of employment turbulence explains
why inequalities in household disposable income
behave counter-cyclically. There are many cases of
reductions in inequality before the crisis, mainly in the
European periphery (eastern European and
Mediterranean countries), while inequalities grew
across two-thirds of Member States from the onset of
the crisis, especially in the hardest hit peripheral
countries but also in some core European and
traditionally egalitarian countries, such as Denmark and
Sweden.
If unemployment emerges as the main channel by
which the Great Recession has pushed income
inequalities upwards, there are two non-market
mechanisms that have also played an important role.
First, the impact of the family pooling of income in
reducing inequalities has been weakened during the
period across most countries, probably due to an
increase in the number of households with no labour
income in many countries as the crisis went on and to a
lesser extent because of a reduction in the size of the
average household across most Member States.
Second, European welfare states have prevented a
greater increase in inequalities by cushioning growing
market income inequalities, especially in some of the
countries that were hardest hit by the crisis in the
European periphery (the Mediterranean and Anglo-
Saxon countries and the Baltics to a lower extent). The
strong pressures and growing strain on public finances
as the crisis continued (especially after 2011, and
especially in the periphery) further underline the
significance of European welfare states in cushioning
the effect of economic turbulence on the distribution of
income and the life chances of Europeans. 
7 Conclusions 
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The Great Recession had a negative impact on real
income levels across Europe, either pushing them
downwards or reducing their pre-crisis growth rates.
This negative impact was notable in the European
periphery (in the Mediterranean and CEE countries in a
protracted way and in Baltic and Anglo-Saxon countries
during the initial stage of the financial crisis) and
especially at the bottom of the income distributions.
But, even if more moderately, income levels were also
affected in Continental and Scandinavian countries, a
fact that is not always reflected in relative indices on
income inequalities or by other indicators. The analysis
of this report suggests that the full magnitude of the fall
in living standards associated with the Great Recession
is not captured by data on GDP per capita, not only in
some of those countries most affected by the crisis, but
also in some core Member States, such as Germany,
which points to the importance of using a wider set of
indicators to assess well-being and economic prosperity
in European societies. 
The size of the middle income classes has been
squeezed from the onset of the crisis across most
countries – most significantly in some peripheral
countries (Mediterranean and eastern European
countries) but also in the core of Europe, where the
middle classes were contracting even before the crisis in
Austria, Germany and Sweden.
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Annex Additional data on income 
inequalities
Table A1: Household disposable income inequality: A comparison when treating negative values (Gini indices)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Negative values included in the analysis
EU 0.356 0.346 0.345 0.339 0.331 0.335 0.336 0.334 0.335 0.338
AT 0.260 0.253 0.258 0.274 0.276 0.280 0.274 0.278 0.271 0.277
BE 0.286 0.278 0.258 0.274 0.262 0.255 0.260 0.261 0.257 0.259
CY 0.281 0.283 0.296 0.285 0.289 0.300 0.291 0.311 0.329 0.360
CZ 0.262 0.254 0.253 0.248 0.253 0.251 0.254 0.253 0.251 0.255
DE 0.277 0.289 0.297 0.295 0.281 0.287 0.286 0.276 0.288 0.304
DK 0.238 0.239 0.255 0.251 0.269 0.263 0.280 0.283 0.273 0.275
EE 0.342 0.330 0.334 0.301 0.307 0.311 0.321 0.325 0.325 0.355
EL 0.332 0.348 0.341 0.337 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.347 0.356 0.358
ES 0.320 0.310 0.310 0.314 0.322 0.331 0.340 0.344 0.344 0.355
FI 0.259 0.258 0.261 0.261 0.254 0.253 0.258 0.258 0.254 0.255
FR 0.274 0.274 0.266 0.293 0.294 0.296 0.304 0.303 0.304 0.289
HU 0.286 0.338 0.267 0.259 0.251 0.246 0.275 0.275 0.286 0.298
IE 0.318 0.319 0.308 0.296 0.287 0.311 0.303 0.305 0.307 0.318
IT 0.327 0.321 0.321 0.309 0.312 0.315 0.322 0.328 0.335 0.328
LT 0.371 0.353 0.336 0.339 0.359 0.383 0.343 0.325 0.349 0.350
LU 0.266 0.285 0.277 0.280 0.297 0.282 0.276 0.281 0.304 0.284
LV 0.369 0.390 0.352 0.364 0.368 0.364 0.355 0.362 0.354 0.353
NL 0.264 0.256 0.276 0.274 0.269 0.256 0.259 0.254 0.252 0.263
PL 0.382 0.341 0.331 0.327 0.322 0.318 0.316 0.314 0.313 0.314
PT 0.376 0.372 0.366 0.357 0.353 0.333 0.339 0.341 0.344 0.348
SE 0.234 0.239 0.233 0.236 0.245 0.239 0.242 0.246 0.249 0.253
SI 0.236 0.235 0.231 0.230 0.222 0.236 0.235 0.237 0.243 0.249
SK 0.266 0.279 0.240 0.236 0.249 0.263 0.258 0.254 0.243 0.267
UK 0.341 0.318 0.321 0.331 0.322 0.327 0.330 0.317 0.306 0.320
Negative values converted to zero
EU 0.355 0.344 0.343 0.337 0.330 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.334 0.336
AT 0.259 0.253 0.258 0.274 0.276 0.280 0.274 0.278 0.270 0.277
BE 0.285 0.275 0.257 0.272 0.257 0.255 0.259 0.259 0.256 0.258
CY 0.281 0.283 0.296 0.285 0.289 0.300 0.290 0.311 0.329 0.360
CZ 0.262 0.254 0.253 0.248 0.253 0.251 0.254 0.253 0.251 0.255
DE 0.277 0.284 0.291 0.293 0.281 0.284 0.283 0.276 0.287 0.297
DK 0.232 0.235 0.246 0.249 0.242 0.250 0.267 0.271 0.270 0.272
EE 0.339 0.329 0.334 0.301 0.307 0.311 0.321 0.325 0.324 0.353
EL 0.330 0.346 0.340 0.332 0.334 0.337 0.335 0.340 0.353 0.357
ES 0.320 0.309 0.310 0.310 0.319 0.329 0.335 0.342 0.341 0.353
FI 0.259 0.258 0.261 0.261 0.254 0.253 0.258 0.258 0.254 0.254
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Negative values converted to zero
FR 0.273 0.274 0.265 0.291 0.294 0.295 0.304 0.303 0.304 0.289
HU 0.286 0.336 0.267 0.258 0.251 0.246 0.275 0.275 0.286 0.298
IE 0.317 0.318 0.308 0.295 0.287 0.311 0.303 0.305 0.307 0.318
IT 0.326 0.320 0.320 0.308 0.311 0.314 0.321 0.326 0.334 0.328
LT 0.371 0.353 0.336 0.339 0.359 0.383 0.342 0.325 0.349 0.350
LU 0.365 0.282 0.277 0.280 0.297 0.281 0.274 0.279 0.303 0.281
LV 0.367 0.388 0.352 0.364 0.368 0.363 0.355 0.362 0.354 0.353
NL 0.257 0.252 0.272 0.270 0.265 0.254 0.252 0.252 0.250 0.261
PL 0.379 0.340 0.330 0.326 0.322 0.318 0.316 0.314 0.313 0.314
PT 0.376 0.372 0.366 0.356 0.352 0.333 0.339 0.340 0.344 0.348
SE 0.231 0.238 0.232 0.235 0.242 0.238 0.240 0.244 0.249 0.252
SI 0.235 0.234 0.230 0.229 0.222 0.235 0.234 0.237 0.243 0.249
SK 0.264 0.279 0.240 0.235 0.248 0.263 0.258 0.254 0.243 0.267
UK 0.341 0.317 0.321 0.331 0.322 0.326 0.328 0.315 0.306 0.316
Negative values dropped from the analysis
EU 0.353 0.343 0.341 0.335 0.328 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.332 0.333
AT 0.259 0.252 0.258 0.274 0.275 0.280 0.274 0.278 0.270 0.277
BE 0.285 0.274 0.256 0.271 0.254 0.254 0.258 0.257 0.256 0.258
CY 0.281 0.283 0.296 0.285 0.289 0.300 0.290 0.311 0.329 0.360
CZ 0.262 0.254 0.253 0.248 0.253 0.251 0.254 0.253 0.251 0.255
DE 0.275 0.281 0.286 0.289 0.279 0.283 0.281 0.274 0.284 0.289
DK 0.229 0.231 0.241 0.243 0.230 0.243 0.260 0.260 0.266 0.267
EE 0.328 0.333 0.300 0.306 0.309 0.319 0.323 0.322 0.351
EL 0.328 0.343 0.338 0.327 0.330 0.334 0.331 0.332 0.347 0.356
ES 0.319 0.309 0.308 0.306 0.315 0.325 0.332 0.337 0.338 0.349
FI 0.259 0.258 0.260 0.260 0.253 0.253 0.257 0.257 0.253 0.254
FR 0.273 0.273 0.264 0.291 0.293 0.294 0.303 0.302 0.303 0.289
HU 0.285 0.333 0.267 0.258 0.251 0.246 0.275 0.275 0.286 0.298
IE 0.316 0.318 0.308 0.295 0.287 0.308 0.302 0.305 0.306 0.317
IT 0.324 0.318 0.317 0.306 0.309 0.311 0.319 0.326 0.331 0.326
LT 0.371 0.353 0.336 0.339 0.359 0.381 0.340 0.323 0.349 0.350
LU 0.264 0.280 0.277 0.279 0.297 0.280 0.272 0.277 0.300 0.278
LV 0.364 0.386 0.350 0.363 0.366 0.361 0.352 0.358 0.351 0.350
NL 0.252 0.248 0.267 0.266 0.262 0.250 0.248 0.249 0.247 0.258
PL 0.373 0.340 0.330 0.325 0.322 0.318 0.316 0.313 0.312 0.314
PT 0.376 0.372 0.365 0.256 0.352 0.333 0.338 0.340 0.344 0.348
SE 0.230 0.235 0.231 0.234 0.240 0.235 0.238 0.242 0.247 0.250
SI 0.235 0.234 0.230 0.229 0.222 0.235 0.234 0.237 0.242 0.249
SK 0.263 0.278 0.239 0.235 0.248 0.263 0.258 0.253 0.243 0.265
UK 0.337 0.314 0.318 0.328 0.319 0.321 0.322 0.310 0.303 0.313
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Annex
Monthly
wages, FTE
(employees)
Monthly labour
income, FTE
(workers)
Monthly
labour
income
(workers)
Annual
labour
income
(active)
Annual
labour
income (all)
Family-pooled
annual labour
income
Household
market
income
Household
disposable
income
EU 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.48 0.61 0.48 0.47 0.34
AT 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.45 0.57 0.43 0.43 0.28
BE 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.56 0.43 0.43 0.26
CY 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.49 0.62 0.43 0.41 0.36
CZ 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.40 0.55 0.40 0.39 0.26
DE 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.46 0.58 0.44 0.43 0.30
DK 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.36 0.51 0.42 0.43 0.27
EE 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.48 0.59 0.45 0.45 0.35
EL 0.27 0.37 0.39 0.56 0.70 0.54 0.52 0.36
ES 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.55 0.64 0.50 0.49 0.35
FI 0.25 0.30 0.31 0.43 0.52 0.42 0.42 0.25
FR 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.41 0.55 0.43 0.43 0.29
HU 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.43 0.60 0.47 0.46 0.30
IE 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.52 0.67 0.54 0.54 0.32
IT 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.45 0.61 0.45 0.45 0.33
LT 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.47 0.58 0.45 0.45 0.35
LU 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.58 0.44 0.43 0.28
LV 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.46 0.58 0.45 0.45 0.35
NL 0.30 0.34 0.37 0.45 0.56 0.42 0.41 0.26
PL 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.46 0.61 0.44 0.44 0.31
PT 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.55 0.65 0.52 0.51 0.35
SE 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.40 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.25
SI 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.44 0.58 0.43 0.42 0.25
SK 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.40 0.54 0.38 0.38 0.27
UK 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.47 0.59 0.48 0.47 0.32
Table A2: Inequality levels in different sources of income in 2014 (Gini indices)
Note: FTE = full-time equivalent
Source: EU-SILC.
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This report addresses growing concerns about
income inequalities in academic and policy
debates by offering a comprehensive study of
income inequalities during the years of the Great
Recession starting in 2008–2009 (income data
relating to 2004–2013). It has the twofold objective
of adopting an EU-wide perspective and providing
an updated picture of inequalities across different
sources of income and in most Member States.
The results show that EU-wide income inequality
declined notably prior to 2008, driven by a strong
process of income convergence between European
countries – but the Great Recession broke this
trend and pushed inequalities upwards both for
the EU as a whole and across most countries. While
previous studies have pointed to widening wage
differentials as the main driver behind the long-
term trend towards growing household disposable
income inequalities across many European
countries, this report identifies unemployment and
its associated decline in labour income as the main
reason behind the inequality surges occurring in
recent years. Real income levels have declined and
the middle classes have been squeezed from the
onset of the crisis across most European countries.
The role played by the family pooling of income in
reducing inequalities and the impact of European
welfare policies in cushioning the effect of
economic turbulences on the distribution of
income are also explored.
The European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) is a
tripartite European Union Agency, whose role is
to provide knowledge in the area of social,
employment and work-related policies.
Eurofound was established in 1975 by Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 1365/75, to contribute to the
planning and design of better living and working
conditions in Europe.
